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Customer Edge Switching (CES) asiakasreunakytkentä ja Realm Gateway (RGW)
alueen yhdyskäytävä tarjoavat ratkaisuja modernin Internetin ydinongelmiin. Ydin-
ongelmiin kuuluvat kytkettyjen laitteiden määrän jatkuva kasvu ja pahantahtoisten
tahojen luomat riskit. CES ja RGW hyödyntävät olemassa olevia tekniikoita kuten
nimipalvelua (DNS).
Ohjelmistojen oikeellisuuden varmistuksessa testaus on välttämätöntä. Sen tavoit-
teena on varmistaa tuotteiden ja protokollien oikea toiminnallisuus. Testaus myös
yrittää löytää kriittiset haavoittuvuudet ohjelmistoissa. Sumea testaus on ohjelmis-
totestauksen alue, joka mahdollistaa odottamattomien syötteiden automaattisen
läpikäynnin.
Tässä työssä arvioimme kahden CES version suorituskykyä, palvelunestohyökkäyk-
sien sietoa ja nimipalvelun käyttöön liittyviä heikkouksia. Suorituskyky on tärkeä
mittari kytkimille. Palvelunesto on erittäin yleinen hyökkäystapa ja nimipalvelun
uudenlainen käyttö vaatii kriittistä arviointia.
Vanhan version suorituskyky oli riittävä. Joitain selviä ongelmia löydettiin. Versio
oli haavoittuvainen palvelunestohyökkäyksille. Löysimme epätarkkuuksia nimipal-
veluiden toiminnassa. Uusi versio vaikuttaa paremmalta kuin vanha versio.
Arvioimme työssä myös Robot Framework testausalustan laajentamisen soveltu-
vuutta Customer Edge Traversal Protocol (CETP) asiakasreunalävistysprotokollan
sumeaan testaukseen. Toteamme, ettei alustan käyttö ollut paras lähestymistapa.
Esitämme myös työmme Robot Framework alustaa hyödyntävän testausalustan
kehityksessä nykyiselle CES versiolle.
Kehitimme myös uuden testausalustan uudelle CES versiolle hyödyntäen Robot
Frameworkia.
Avainsanat: CES, CETP, PRGW, sumea testaus, testaus, Robot Framework,
tietoturva
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1 Introduction
Internet was designed with the assumption that communication will take place
between trusted hosts. As it has grown in use and size beyond original design goals,
this basis of trust has come under attack by malicious entities. The limits of original
routing scheme have been reached and better solutions for connecting all of the users
around the globe are needed. The current solutions are less than ideal and fresh look
for alternatives is needed.
End-to-end principle, where all hosts on Internet are reachable with uniquely
identifying IP (Internet Protocol)-address, has been forgone. Due to limitations of
IP version 4 (IPv4) the most widely used communication protocol, it is not possible
any more to achieve end-to-end for all users.
Internet is a network of interconnected networks. Boundaries between these
networks are edges and processing can and do happen at them. It can enable hosts
inside different networks to communicate with each other despite not being able to
directly address each other. Network Address Translation is a popular solution, but
with some undesirable limitations. One of such limitations is that hosts are hard to
connect to from a different network.
World has become reliant on the Internet for many services such as finances,
communications and information transmission and storage. Large scale development
and use of Internet of Things (IoT) is also predicted adding computing and communi-
cation to many new devices. In the world, where Internet permeates everything and
is used for many aspects of life, risks towards it and its uses are critical for operation
of the economy and even public safety. The increased focus should be put to securing
the communication and devices, and preventing any potential attacks. Currently
popular tools include firewalls capable of filtering traffic and Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) for more advanced traffic monitoring and intrusion detection.
Preventing attacks is not enough as communicated information itself has value.
Securing the communication from leaking to unauthorized parties is also one re-
quirement for any modern system. This is often achieved with cryptography where
information is mathematically secured so that only those with relevant knowledge can
understand it. Authentication of the party being communicated with is also attained
with the use of cryptography. Commonly these goals are reached with Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) were trusted parties validate information provided by one or
both parties communicating.
Domain Name System is a core part of the modern Internet, where simple human
readable names are used for connecting to services instead of hard to remember
numeric or alphanumeric addresses. This provides many benefits such as allowing
changing of the IP addresses of the hosts.
Customer Edge Switching (CES) is a system that aims to bring all of the aspects
presented above together in a new system. CES system currently consist of CES
used to facilitate communication between hosts behind different CES instances and
Private Realm Gateway (PRGW) for allowing communication to and from hosts not
behind another CES. DNS is leveraged as existing technology to decouple the hosts
from traditional addresses and for allowing multiple hosts to share a small pool of
2addresses. This approach should allow better access to private hosts from Internet
hosts than current NATs do. In communication between CES instances the sides
confirm each other’s identity using Customer Edge Travelsal Protocol (CETP), which
can also be used to secure the communication. CES also offers policies that can
be defined as requirements for accepting communication from other CES instances.
This makes it possible for instances to negotiate with each other based on policies
stored in them to attain trust. RGW protects the hosts behind it by only allowing
traffic when a private host is queried for and can provide Application Layer Gateways
(ALG) to help communication with protocols with special requirements.
Testing is needed and commonly used to finding defects in software products.
Automated testing is beneficial for quick iteration of software development. This can
be done on various levels from testing individual pieces of code to testing that whole
product performs as expected and behaviour haven’t changed from previous versions.
Effective regression testing can be achieved with the use of testing frameworks. In this
thesis Robot Framework, a high level expandable keyword based testing environment
was used. Testing also expands to the field of security. Aim of security is to prevent
attacker from gaining access to the system or information in the system, or preventing
the attacker from harming the system.
Research Problem
Initially the primary goal was set as introducing fuzz testing using Robot Framework
and carry on developing the test framework for CES, by improving coverage and
portability. It was also considered valid to get fresh perspective of general security
of the system. Fuzz testing was considered to be interesting avenue for testing CES
as software product and it was not utilized previously in testing of CES.
Later as a new version of RGW was released, the focus of the work changed to
moving existing tests where possible to the new system and checking for correct
operation.
Research Objectives
One of the key goals of the work was to evaluate Robot Framework in fuzz testing
of CES. For this various existing libraries available were evaluated. As these were
found lacking due to nature of the protocol used in CES, custom extension for Robot
Framework was seen as the solution.
In addition well known tools were evaluated for testing the general security of
CES. Focus in part on DNS as key technology of CES was chosen. In addition to
this operation and performance of multiple protocols and systems survivability under
load were chosen as additional metrics for research.
Due to new version of software not having the CES features available, work
was focused on reintroducing existing tests for testing new version of RGW and to
evaluating operation of protocols and their performance on it. Existing test suites
were found hard to port to the new version of RGW. Effort therefore was devoted to
3building new test suites and building blocks, for testing the new version of RGW,
from ground up using best practises.
Structure
The structure of thesis is the following: In Chapter 2 we cover Internet protocol
suite and describe protocols in it to build a base of understanding. In the chapter we
also expand on other relevant technologies and protocols for the thesis. Chapter 3
discusses Network Address Translation (NAT), gives overview of security and related
technologies, and covers software and fuzz testing in relation of this work. Chapter 4
describe our test environment and the systems under test. Chapter 5 gives more
technical details of the tools used and developed. Chapters six to eight cover the
work done with Chapter 6 focusing on testing CES version 1, Chapter 7 describing
application and work done using fuzz testing on CES version 1 and Chapter 8 focusing
on work done on CES version 2 and new test suites build. Finally in Chapter 9
we provide the conclusions. Appended are CETPLibrary and its resource file and
example of its use.
42 Internet protocol suite, common protocols and
related technologies
First in this chapter we cover the Internet Protocol suite standard, which defines
the model and standard protocols of the Internet. We describe the 4-layer model of
the suite. Next we present the description of protocols defined in the suite: Internet
Protocol version 4 (IPv4) with Classless Internet Domain Routing and subnetting and
IP address allocation, Transport Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol
(UDP), Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP). After these protocols we provide
some relevant information of link-layer namely Ethernet and Medium Access Control
(MAC) addressing. We also present some aspects of DNS and conclude the chapter
with Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
2.1 Internet protocol suite
Communication between and inside computer networks is defined in the framework
of Internet protocol suite, later in the chapter referred to as the suite, defined
in Request for Comments(RFC) 1122.[1] This model consist of 4 layers namely
link, internet, transport and application. There are other popular models such as
Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model) that consists of 7 layers physical,
datalink, network, transport, session, presentation and application layers.[2] We
however will focus on the Internet protocol suite which some other models expand
with 5th physical layer.
Link layer
Link layer in the suite is for hosts to communicate over a network they are directly
connected to and it must implement protocols used for this interfacing. The suite
also describes encapsulation between link and Internet layer and Address Resolution
protocol (ARP), both presented in the Section 2.8.[1] The link layer transfers frames
over a network. A frame is a finite sequence of bits or octets. In a packet network a
frame has delimiters for the beginning and the ending of the frame. The header of
the frame carries the link layer address of the sender and the receiver.
Network layer
Network layer is also known as Internet Layer in the suite. In the suite Internet
Protocol (IP) is used to carry data between hosts across a number of link layer
networks. All end to end transport layer protocols use it. IP itself is connectionless
and provides no guarantees of delivery, making layers above responsible for reliable
delivery. ICMP presented in Section 2.7 is considered to be Internet layer protocol
in the suite even if it does use IP for carrying data.[1]
We will describe IP version 4 (IPv4) in detail in Section 2.2. There are many
benefits with the new version 6 and critical shortcomings of the older version 4, which
will be discussed in Section 2.4.
5Transport layer
Transport layer provides a channel of end-to-end communication for the application
layer. Two of the original protocols in the suite are TCP and UDP. Transport
Control Protocol (TCP) is a reliable connection oriented protocol, meaning that the
protocol guarantees that data will be delivered to the other party and there being a
permanent channel formed over which communications happens somewhat analogous
to a phone call. User Datagram Protocol is connectionless (“datagram”) transport
service. This means that each message is an individual block of data and delivery
is not guaranteed. A common feature of both TCP and UDP is that they allow
identifying the application on both sending and the receiving host. This is done
using 16 bit source and destination port numbers in the protocol headers. These
protocols are also discussed in detail later in the chapter.[1]
Application layer
Application layer is the top layer of the suite. The application layer provides services
to processes for seamless communication. Examples of application layer protocols
are Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) designed for browsing websites, File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) for transferring files between hosts and Secure Shell (SSH)
for encrypted remote connections. In modern web-technology HTTP protocol is
used to provide a multitude of services such as video streaming and even operating
programs on the Internet. All user facing protocols communicating over Internet
utilize one or another application layer protocol.
2.2 Internet protocol version 4
Network layer protocol of the suite is the Internet Protocol. Two versions are in use
version 4 (IPv4) supported by all devices connected to Internet directly and new
version 6 (IPv6) which is designed to replace IPv4. IPv4 is first described in RFC
791 dating back to 1981 which replaced earlier definition of RFC 760 from 1980.[3][4]
Current standard for IPv6 can be found in RFC 2460 from 2006. We will also present
some aspects in Section 2.4.[5]
Every IPv4 packet has a header presented in Figure 2.1, containing the various
fields including source and destination addresses. These fields make up the minimum
length of IPv4 packet of 20 octets. IPv4 addresses were designed to be globally
routable meaning that messages can travel from any publicly routed address to any
other. IPv4 uses 32 bit addresses providing total address space of over 4 billion
unique addresses.[3] IPv4 addresses are commonly written as 192.168.254.101 with
each of dot separated number corresponding to 1 byte of the address.
2.2.1 IPv4 Header
The header is presented in Figure 2.1. First 4 bit version field defines the version of
protocol, 4 for IPv4. In same octet Internet Header Length (IHL) field contains
6number of 4 octet groups in the header in a 4 bit value. Maximum size of the header
is 15 such groups or 60 octets, with smallest possible size being 20 octets.
The following octet contains 6 bit long Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)
and 2 bit long Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) fields. DSCP was originally
reserved for Type of Service, but was later redefined for use with Differentiated
services such as Voice over IP, which would allow providing different classes of
transport services based on the type of traffic.[6] ECN allows end-to-end notifications
of congestion.[7]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Version IHL DSCP ECN Total Length
Identification Flags Fragment Offset
TTL Protocol Header Checksum
Source Address
Destination Address
Options
· · ·
Figure 2.1: IP version 4 header
The 16 bit Total Length field stores the length of the datagram in octets limiting
the maximum length to 65535 octets. The protocol requires support for minimum of
576 octet long datagrams, but in practice the datagrams are larger than the minimum.
The upper limit, however, is a theoretical limit that is rarely used as lower layers
limit it.[8]. Too large datagrams can require fragmentation which is a practise where
a datagram is broken into multiple parts and reassembled at either another router
or receiving host. The 16 bit Identification field is primarily used for tracking
fragments of datagrams mentioned above. In the past it has been used for spoofing
detection, but this practise has been prohibited[9].
Of the following two octets 3 bits are reserved for flags with the first bit being
reserved, second bit Don’t Fragment (DF) and third one More Fragments (MF). When
DF is set, the datagram will be dropped if transmitting it would require fragmentation.
This feature can be used for Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) discovery where
datagrams increasing in size are sent to discover the maximum size of the datagram
that can be transmitted over the path without fragmentation. MF flag is used with
fragmented datagrams, where it is set for all the datagrams apart from the last one,
which also has non-zero fragment offset field. Fragment offset field is stored in the
following 13 bits. Offset value is the number of 8 octet groups from the beginning of
the datagram, such that the first fragment has value of 0 and the value of 185 would
correspond to 1481th octet of the datagram.
Time To Live (TTL) is an 8 bit field designed to prevent datagrams from trav-
7elling infinitely on Internet. The value is specified in seconds but in practice it is
the number of hops on the route, where each router decrements it by one. When it
reaches zero, the datagram is dropped and ICMP Time Exceeded message is sent to
source address. The process is described in more detail in Section 2.7.
The 8 bit Protocol field stores the protocol of the carried datagram or packet,
examples of protocols and their numbers are 6 for TCP, 7 for UDP and 254 for “Use
in experimentation and testing”.[10] Next 16 bits contain the Header checksum used
for error checking of the header. Each time a router receives a datagram, it calculates
the checksum and compares it to the one stored in the datagram to discover any
errors. If checksums do not match, the datagram is dropped. The 32-bit Source
and Destination addresses are next. Addresses are followed by potential optional
headers padded to 32 bits.
2.3 Classless Internet Domain Routing and Subnetting
Subnetworking is the practise of dividing an IP address to network prefix and host
number, and treating all addresses sharing a network prefix as a single subnetwork.
Assigning addresses from a subnetwork to all hosts in the subnetwork is preferred as
it allows aggregation in routing and allows the holder of the network to sub-divide
its address blocks more freely. Additionally there is the penalty of first and last
addresses of the network have special meanings of identifying network and being
broadcast addresses for the network respectively. Therefore they cannot be used for
identifying hosts.
Class Prefix Number of Addresses Address
length bits networks in network Range
A 8 128 16777216 0.0.0.0 - 127.255.255.255
B 16 16384 65536 128.0.0.0 - 191.255.255.255
C 24 2097152 256 192.0.0.0 - 223.255.255.255
Table 2.1: Classfull Internet address
In early days IP address ranges were divided in Classes A, B, C, D and E for
purposes of Classfull routing. The sizes of A, B and C can be seen in Table 2.1. There
is a very limited amount of Class A networks with massive 16,7 million addresses, at
the time too large to be fully utilized even by the biggest corporations. However,
the smallest Class C’s 256 addresses are too few for most administrated networks.
Subnetworking is represented with sub-network mask, with one way being an
IP address of all ones. An example can be found in Table 2.2 where the address
192.168.254.112 and its subnet mask 255.255.255.0 is shown. All hosts sharing
the same subnet mask and network prefix are in the same subnetwork. There can
be multiple separate subnetworks with same addresses in different private networks.
Being in the same network allows hosts to use the last address of the network as
broadcast address to send packets to all hosts in the network. 192.168.254.255
8Binary Decimal
Address 11000000.10101000.11111110 .01110000 192.168.254.112
Mask 11111111.11111111.11111111 .00000000 255.255.255.0
Network prefix 11000000.10101000.11111110 .00000000 192.168.254.0
Broadcast 11000000.10101000.11111110 .11111111 192.168.254.255
Host part 00000000.00000000.00000000 .00001010 0.0.0.112
Table 2.2: Subnet Mask, Network prefix and host part for 198.18.0.10
would be such address for a network with a network mask of 255.255.255.0.
Classless Internet Domain Routing (CIDR) was adopted to allow more fine
grained division of networks. It is defined in RFC 4632 Classless Inter-domain
Routing (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation Plan[11]. In
CIDR network prefixes are divided by single bits instead of octets of classfull routing.
For example in the 10.0.0.0/8, a Class A private network, the address is the first
address of the subnetwork and number after slash is the length of the subnet mask.
Our example in Table 2.2 would have 192.168.254.0/24 for network or alternatively
denoting that subnetwork in 192.168.254.112/24.
2.3.1 IP address allocation
IP addresses are allocated in ranges by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
to regional Internet registries (RIR) who further allocate them to organisations such as
corporations, public and private organisations and service providers. Certain ranges
are reserved for special use with relevant for this work listed in Table 2.3. Notable in
the list are the Private-Use ranges, which are networks that are not globally routed
and are free for use in private networks. In addition 198.18.0.0/15 is reserved
for "Network Interconnect Device Benchmark Testing" which is also an non-globally
routed network and as such used as additional network in test environment for CES
version 1.[12] Range 100.64.0.0/10 allocated for Carrier-grade NAT or Large Scale
NAT is used in the environment for CES version 2.[13]
0.0.0.0/8 "This host on this network"
10.0.0.0/8 Private-Use
100.64.0.0/10 Carrier-grade NAT
127.0.0.0/8 Loopback
172.16.0.0/12 Private-Use
192.168.0.0/16 Private-Use
198.18.0.0/15 Benchmarking
240.0.0.0/4 Reserved
255.255.255.255/32 Limited Broadcast
Table 2.3: Some IPv4 Special-Use Address Registry entries
92.4 Internet Protocol version 6 IPv6
IP version 6 defined in RFC 2460 is designed to replace IPv4.[5] The main difference
between protocols is the address length which has been increased to 128 bits in
IPv6. IPv6 allows 3.4∗1038 addresses compared to IPv4’s 4∗109. The change means
that the protocol is unlikely to run out of usable addresses. IPv6 also simplifies
header processing by not having the checksum recalculated on each hop. Also IPv6
does not allow fragmentation on the route. Fragmentation is either avoided entirely,
performed by sender or end points find MTU using MTU discovery[14][15].
IPv6 also allows taking advantage of the large address space by using sparse
allocation. By leaving space between allocations it is possible at later time to expand
the sub-networks while keeping the same prefix. This is not possible with IPv4 as
new allocations are small and from different blocks. Due to small allocations IPv4
addresses space is fragmented and sub-networks owned by same entities do not form
continues blocks.
Routing on Internet often combines multiple smaller sub-networks together in
single routes for purposes of forwarding packets to next hop if possible. Fragmentation
of the address space results in sub-networks being smaller and more numerous
compared to optimal solution leading to higher memory and processing requirements
in routers.
2.5 Transport Control Protocol TCP
Transport Control Protocol (TCP) is widely used connection-oriented data streaming
protocol that offers reliable ordered and error checked service to protocols using it.
Many protocols such as HTTP and FTP use TCP as transport layer protocol. The
protocol is defined in RFC 793.[16]
2.5.1 TCP Header
TCP header consist of 20 octets with potential for further information known as
options. First 4 octets contain two 2 16-bit fields: source and destination ports,
which allows the maximum of 65536 port numbers. These port numbers together
with source and destination IP address in the IP-header identify the connection
of the packet.
Port numbers are followed by 32-bit Sequence- and Acknowledgement numbers.
These are used to achieve ordered and reliable service. Next is 16-bits consisting of
4-bit offset for header length in 32-bit words, 3 reserved bits, and 9 flag bits. NS, CWR,
ECE, UGR, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN and FIN.
NS, CWR and ECE flags are used for various aspects of Explicit Congestion Notifi-
cation technique, which allows a way of communicating congestion between the end
points thus preventing need of dropping packets. These were added to protocol in
RFC 3168.[7] URG indicates urgent pointer field being significant. ACK for significance
of acknowledgement field. PSH is for pushing buffered data to application. RST for
resetting connection. SYN for synchronisation of sequence numbers with first packets.
Some other flags also depend on SYN. FIN is for ending connection.
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Figure 2.2: TCP Header
16-bit window size field indicates the number of units the sender is willing to
receive from current acknowledgement value. Followed by 16-bit error checking
checksum of header and data. Protocol ends with 0 to 40 octets of options coded
as type-length-value of 1 octet type, 1 octet length and variable length data. Header
is padded to 32-bit boundary.
Ports 0-1023 are System Ports, 1023-49151 User Ports and 49152-65535 Dynamic
and/or Private Ports. Both System Ports and User Ports are assigned by IANA.
Dynamic ports are never assigned.[17] Few ports such as 0, 1021, 1022, 1023 and
1024 are reserved, of these 0 is commonly used as a wish from a program to the
operating system for assigning a port, 1021 and 1022 are reserved for experimentation
and 1023 and 1024 for potential future expansion of ranges. As such the System
ports are commonly used for well known protocols and services and often require
higher privileges to use. User Ports are commonly used by specific services, but
do not require escalated privileges. Dynamic ports are mainly used for temporary
connections and as source ports when connecting to other hosts.
2.5.2 Operation
TCP connection is usually established by a 3-way handshake presented in Figure 2.3.
The handshake consist of three packets, first the initiator sends a packet with SYN
flag, to which the receiver responds with a packet with SYN+ACK flags, if it wishes to
establish the connection, to which the initiator responds with an ACK flagged packet
establishing the connection.
After the connection has been established ,data can be transferred over the
connection. A sequence number is chosen while establishing the connection. For
streaming, the data is broken up to pieces. The number of bytes from start of the
data to the first byte of a piece is added to sequence number, allowing the reordering
of the received data if needed. Packets arriving out-of-order can happen for example
when they are routed over different paths.
When some amount of packets have been received a packet with ACK flag and a
sequence number is sent confirming that all data before that sequence number has
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Figure 2.3: TCP 3 way handshake
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Figure 2.4: TCP transmission and retransmission
been received, as seen in Figure 2.4. Where first the data packets with sequence
numbers 1000 and 1100 are sent from the Host A and received by the Host B which
then sends a packet with the ACK flag set and the sequence number of 1100. The
packet with the sequence number of 1200 from Host A to Host B is lost in transit.
When this happens the Host B does not send an ACK packet but waits for the
Host A to retransmit the packets, which it then acknowledges with a packet with
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corresponding SEQ number. With the last packet of a certain amount of the data
such as single message, PSH flag can be used to tell that the receiver should forward
data to application holding the socket.
Finally, packets with FIN flags and responses to these with ACK can be used to
close a connection. RST flag can also be used to tear down the connection when the
other party does not have a context for it anymore.
2.6 User Datagram Protocol
User Datagram Protocol is the other popular transport-layer protocol on Internet
defined in RFC 768.[18] It is a connectionless datagram protocol, offering no guar-
antees of delivery or ordering, unlike TCP. However, in some applications, such as
Voice over IP and low latency gaming and control, these are desired qualities as loss
of some data is preferable to waiting for full retransmission of past data as in TCP.
UDP is also less resource intensive to implement compared to full TCP/IP-stack, as
it does not necessitate large buffers or complex state handling. Thus it offers a good
alternative if the use of standard and common networking technology is desired, but
the hardware resources are restricted. Examples of such cases are various sensors
and simple devices like electronic locks. DNS is one protocol which utilizes UDP
often as most requests and responses are small and connection setup and teardown
is not desired, although for large transfers TCP is used.
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Source Port Destination Port
Length Checksum
Figure 2.5: UDP Header
UDP is a very light weight protocol only having source and destination port,
length and checksum fields in its header. UDP ports used to share the same purpose
allocation as the TCP, but nowadays only port in the relevant protocol is assigned.
This process is described in RFC 6335.[17] As seen in Figure 2.5 all fields are 16-bit
meaning that maximum length of the packet is 65536 octets. The checksum of UDP
is not mandatory with IPv4 as the functionality is provided by the lower layer.
2.7 Internet Control Message Protocol ICMP
ICMP is the protocol used for communicating error messages and relaying query
messages. Protocol is defined in RFC 792 with some parts deprecated in RFC
6918.[19][20] Common use cases for it include Time exceeded send when IP data-
grams TTL reaches 0, Echo request tool known as ping commonly used to find if a
host is reachable and answers, Destination unreachable generated when datagram
can not be routed to destination, Redirect when the receiving router knows that
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there is a better route via another router. For these we presented the messages in
this section.
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Type Code Checksum
Content
Figure 2.6: ICMP header
ICMP header consists of 8-bit Type value, 8-bit Code value and 16-bit Checksum
with a variable number of 4 octet long data. Common types used are 0 and 8 with
the code of 0 for echo reply and request respectively. Code 3 destination
unreachable with various codes. Code 5 redirect message for redirecting further
communication for the network or host. Code 11 time exceeded for TTL expiring
in the transit.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Type = 11 Code = 0/1 Checksum
unused
IP header + first 8 bytes
Figure 2.7: ICMP Time exceeded
ICMP Time exceeded see Figure 2.7 is used when TTL of a packet reaches 0 as
described in Section 2.2, in cases when TTL reaches 0 the code is set to 0. Another
use case is when a host fails to reassemble fragmented datagram and ICMP Time
Exceed is sent with code of 1. A common use of this message is traceroute utility
used for mapping the route between hosts.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Type = 3 Code = 0-15 Checksum
unused Next-hop MTU
IP header + first 8 bytes
Figure 2.8: ICMP Destination Unreachable
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ICMP Destination Unreachable Figure 2.8 is send to inform that the host or
network cannot be reached. Typical codes include unreachable network 0, host
1, protocol 2 and port 3. Code 4 is used when too large packet is received with
don’t fragment flag.
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Type = 5 Code = 0-4 Checksum
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Figure 2.9: ICMP Protocol Redirect
ICMP Redirect presented in Figure 2.9 is used when a router needs to convey
routing information to a host. It has 4 codes for redirections of datagrams: 0 for
network, 1 for host, 2 for Type of Service (ToS) and network, and 3 for ToS and
host. The message includes new destination that the router deems the host having
a more direct path and IP Header plus 8 bytes for the host to identify the packet
which triggered the message.
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Figure 2.10: ICMPl Echo Request and Reply
Figure 2.10 presents packets for ICMP Echo Request type 8 and Echo Reply
type 0. These messages are the most common way to establish that host is reachable
in process known as pinging. In the process, one host sends Echo Request packet
with an identifier and sequence number set which the other host answers with same
identifier and sequence number. If a payload is included, it must also be in the reply
packet.
2.8 Link layer, Ethernet, MAC addresses and ARP
The data link layer is responsible for the low level routing of frames and physical
transmission of data in the chosen medium. Internet Protocol allows the interconnec-
tion of multiple different data link layer technologies, by having routing itself happen
on the network layer. Technologies in the layer are commonly defined in standards
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written by working groups of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
Thus it allows, for example WiFi devices utilizing IEEE 802.11 standards wireless
LAN, cell phones utilizing LTE’s E-UTRA, desktops utilizing Fast Ethernet and
core routers operating with various fiber-based technologies to communicate with
each other. Many of these are standards under IEEE working group 802.[21] Next,
Ethernet will be described as the most relevant technology for our test setup.
2.8.1 Ethernet
Ethernet datagram or frame carries 48-bit destination and sources addresses,
optional IEEE 802.1Q header allowing Virtual LANs in the network. Followed by
16-bit Ethertype or length field, used to identify the protocol encapsulated inside
the frame for values over 1500. Next is the payload data for example datagram of
network layer protocol, followed by cyclic redundancy check (CRC) checksum.
Ethernet addresses are commonly known as Medium Address Control (MAC) ad-
dresses. MAC addresses should uniquely identify a network adapter. The 48-bit long
addresses are usually presented as groups of 6 hex pairs such as 00:01:02:00:01:11
where first 3 pairs are the organizationally unique identifier (OUI) pur-
chased from IEEE Registration Authority and latter 3 pairs are Network Interface
Controller Specific. These identifiers are used for lower level routing by switches
which can learn them and thus route traffic only to ports where such address is
known to communicate from. The process allows better utilization of networking
capacity as not all traffic need to be sent on all connected lines.
2.8.2 Address Resolution Protocol
Address resolution protocol is an integral part of the routing mentioned above and
is used to find MAC addresses for IP addresses. The protocol is defined in RFC
826.[22] Examples of ARP headers are presented in figures 2.11 and 2.12.
The header consist of 16-bit Hardware type field specifying the protocol, 16-
bit Protocol type field storing the protocol for IPv4 0x0080, Hardware address
Length for storing length of Hardware address 6 for Ethernet, Protocol address
length for storing length of protocol address with IPv4 this is 4 and Operation field
specifying operation with 1 for request and 2 for reply. Next is variable length
sender hardware address storing the Media address that is MAC address in case
of Ethernet and sender protocol address such as IPv4 address, in request these
fields contain information of the sender of the request. These are followed by similar
two fields for the target, which in reply are used to indicate the address of the host
sending the original request.
A simple case of ARP operating is when a host needs to connect to an IP address it
has not communicated with or heard before, as the modern systems listen to the ARP
traffic and store it for future use. For example if the host with IP 198.18.0.112 tries
to connect to host at 198.18.0.10, i.e case both hosts are in the same subnetwork,
it will send an ARP seen in Figure 2.11 where it stores its hardware address,
protocol address and the protocol address which hardware address it wants
to discover, the target hardware address is filled with zeroes.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Hardware type: Ethernet (1)
Protocol type: IP (0x0800)
Operation: request (1)
Sender hardware address:
00:01:02:00:01:12
Sender protocol address:
198.18.0.112
Target hardware address:
00:00:00:00:00:00
Target protocol address:
198.18.0.10
Figure 2.11: Example of ARP Request
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Hardware type: Ethernet (1)
Protocol type: IP (0x0800)
Operation: reply (2)
Sender hardware address:
00:00:00:00:02:a1
Sender protocol address:
198.18.0.10
Target hardware address:
00:01:02:00:01:12
Target protocol address:
198.18.0.112
Figure 2.12: Example of ARP Response
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In the response seen in Figure 2.12, when such host is around, it sends a reply
containing its hardware and protocol addresses in sender fields and has filled
requesters hardware and protocol addresses in target fields.
2.9 Domain Name System
Domain Name System is a hierarchical decentralized system for naming services of
hosts and resources on the Internet. It is not only limited to retrieval of the numerical
IP addresses matching to the names, but also can store other information. Thus it
allows interconnecting these two address spaces. Domain name system is defined in
RFC 1034 and 1035 later clarified by RFC 2181.[23][24][25]
Domain Name System allows the use of human readable addresses such as
www.aalto.fi by mapping these to network addresses. Fully qualified domain
(FQDN) names such as www.aalto.fi are addresses that are complete containing both
hostname and domain name. In this case, .fi is the top-level domain for Finland and
its holder Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) has authority
over it forming a zone for all .fi domains. Aalto University has registered the
aalto.fi domain from them and has authority over domains and hosts under it
forming another zone. One such host is the www, from world wide web, which is
commonly used for the address of a server or servers serving the websites. Similarly,
there can be other domain names such as mail.aalto.fi which is the internal
webmail service of Aalto University. Inside the same network, it is often possible to
also use just the hostnames. As such if you want to connect to kosh.aalto.fi one
of University’s general use Linux servers you can just write kosh in a tool.
Domain name system forms a hierarchy. Highest in the hierarchy are the root
name servers responsible for the root zone that is the zone containing all of the
top-level domains such as .fi, .com and .net. For these top-level-domains, there
are responsible servers controlling these zones. And then under them, there are
registered domain names each being their own domain and potentially so on. In
the system when an address is queried, first the root name server is queried for
matching top-level-domain and server responsible, then the server responsible for
top-level-domain is queried for the domain itself returning the matching name server,
which can have the relevant address available or further zones are checked.
2.9.1 Domain Name Querying and Messages
Two ways of making queries are recursive queries where the DNS server to which the
user sends the request performs the whole query process and iterative queries where
the DNS server return a hint for next server to query for an address.
Domain name query/response header presented in Figure 2.13 consist of 16 bit
ID field identifying the query, followed by 1 bit QR Flag indicating if the header is
query or response. 4-bit Opcode for Operation Code used for the type of query. The
supported types are standard query, status request, notify used for notifying the slave
servers about changes in the zone data and update for allowing selective changes
in resource records. This is followed by 1-bit Flags: AA for an authoritative answer,
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in which case the server is authoritative for the record’s zone; TC for indicating
truncation of the message; RD for recursion desired in a query used to indicate that
recursive query is desired and RA recursion available to indicate if the server supports
or allows recursive queries; Z for zero as that is a reserved bit; AD flag for authenticated
data indicating that server has authenticated data according to servers policies; CD
for checking disabled. Filling the 16 bits is 4 bits for RCode: a return code used for
possible errors. Next 4 16-bit fields in the end are Question Count for the number
of questions in a message, although no more than 1 question is supported. ANcount
for Answer record count i.e number of answers message. NSCount is for the number
of records in Authority section and Additional Record Count for records in the
Additional section.
The DNS system supports multiple types of records which have both human
readable and identification value. Human readable ones are usually used in writing
configuration files and interpreting DNS responses. Common types include A(1)
for IPv4 addresses, AAAA(28) for IPv6 addresses, MX(15) for mail servers, PTR(12)
usually used for reverse records meaning for names from IP address and NAPTR(35)
Naming authority pointers for special use cases. The system also has CLASSes which
allow multiple namespaces, most common is the IN for the Internet.
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R OpCode AA TC RD RA Z AD CD RCODE
QDCOUNT/ZOCOUNT
ANCOUNT/PRCOUNT
NSCOUNT/UPCOUNT
ARCOUNT
Figure 2.13: DNS header
A normal DNS query consists of DNS message with ID field set to transaction
ID. QR bits set to 0 to indicate a query. RD flag can be used if recursion is desired.
The QDCOUNT is set to one. The header is followed by the query which starts with
the domain name with length of label and label pairs and ending at zero length
label. Such as for www.aalto.fi value being hex 03 77 77 77(www), 05 61 61 6c
74 6f(aalto), 02 66 69(fi) and 00. This is followed by 2 octet type and 2 octet
class.
The answer to the above query would have a reply with the same ID and QR bit
set to 1 to indicate a response. RA bit can also be set to indicate that the server does
offer recursion. The question count would be set to 1 and ANCOUNT to the number
of answers included. Following the header would be the original question and the
answers, hat include name, type, class, time to live, data length and value.
Time to live indicates for how long the answer is still valid in seconds. The practice
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allows caching of answers either at hosts or recursive servers which lessen the load
on authoritative servers.
2.10 Application Layer protocols
Application layer protocols are the protocols that the applications use. Next we
present HTTP and FTP as examples of them.
2.10.1 Hyper Text Transport Protocol
Hyper Text Transport Protocol HTTP is a protocol designed to transfer hypertext,
interlinked text of traditional websites, pictures, stylistic guides for web page presen-
tation and computer code run inside browsers. But it is also used for a multitude
of other purposes such as video and music, both live and served to requests, as its
popularity has meant that it has a wide support on a variety of platforms and it is
allowed to pass via most firewalls.
Various versions of HTTP exist with the commonly used version being HTTP/1.1
defined in RFC 7230.[26] HTTP 1.1 is a plain text Request-Response protocol.
Each request consist of request a line with a keyword from: GET, HEAD, POST, PUT,
DELETE, CONNECT, OPTION, TRACE and PATCH; followed by possible header fields
including further information such as the version of the application, an empty line
and potential body for payload. Responses consist of status code, header fields,
an empty line and message body.
GET / HTTP /1.1
Host: test.gwa.demo
User -Agent: curl /7.47.0
Accept: */*
HTTP /1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx /1.10.0 (Ubuntu)
Date: Mon , 27 Feb 2017 13:21:09 GMT
Content -Type: text/html; charset=UTF -8
Transfer -Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep -alive
... HTML site ...
Listing 2.1: HTTP/1.1 communication
In Listing 2.1 we present a simple communication. Capture of website retrieval
from test.gwa.demo using HTTP/1.1. GET method is used for retrieving the site as
a request. In header fields: User-Agent indicates curl, a command line browser,
as the application used. Accept: */* indicates that any file is accepted. In the
response we get protocol used and the status code of 200 OK for successful retrieval.
In header fields we see the server: nginx, date and time of the request, details
about content, encoding used for transfer and wish for connection to be kept alive.
The above is followed by the html code of the website.
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2.10.2 File Transfer Protocol
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is an old protocol designed to transfer files between
hosts operating on TCP. It is defined in RFC 959.[27] In many cases, it has been
replaced by other protocols such as HTTP, SCP and even Peer-to-peer protocols like
BitTorrent. It does have many use cases as many platforms have tools supporting it
default configurations and it being relatively simple and light protocol due to its age
pre-dating TCP/IP itself.
DATA
Client
CMD
Client
CMD
Client
DATA
Server
Response 220
Request: USER
Response: 331 PASS
Request: PASS
Response: 230 Login successful
Active
Passive
msc
Figure 2.14: FTP Connection establishment
FTP is text-based protocol, were simple requests are sent and 3 number response
codes are received from the server. FTP has two operating modes, namely active
and passive. In both cases, client initiates the negotiation by connecting to the
server port 21. In the active, mode client provides server an address port pair
it wished to be connected to. In the passive mode the server provides a second
address port pair for the client to connect to for the data path. The passive
mode is needed for cases where the client is behind a NAT or a firewall that blocks
incoming connections. In Figure 2.14 a simple scenario of a user connecting to a
server receiving information, sending username, receiving prompt for password and
being successfully logged in is presented. From the figure, the process of agreeing
on transfer mode and transmission of information related to directory and such is
omitted.
Data transfer itself happens over the data channel formed as described above.
Data can be transferred in 4 different modes, ASCII of 8-bit ascii bytes of host
representation, binary mode of pure bytes, EBCDIC mode for transferring EBCDIC
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character set and local mode for proprietary formats matching on both end points.
Three modes are also present, stream mode where TCP is responsible for processing,
block mode where data is broken into chunks of header, length and data, and the
compressed mode where compression algorithm such as run-length encoding, in cases
of repeated bytes their number and character in question is stored, is employed.
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3 Network address translation, security, software
and fuzz testing
In this chapter we first present relevant information about Network Address Transla-
tion. Followed by inherent security weaknesses of IP networks and common attacks.
After them we discuss some aspects of cryptography. Finally, we conclude the chapter
with overview of software and fuzz testing.
3.1 Network Address Translation
Network Address Translation (NAT) is a method of mapping one address to another
by changing IP addresses and the checksum of a datagram. The motivation for this
is connecting one address space to another, such as a private network to the general
public Internet. This is a popular use case as there are more devices connected to
the Internet than there are available addresses, thus NAT is used to allow multiple
devices to connect to the Internet using a shared address or addresses.[28]
The simplest form of the NAT is the basic NAT or one-to-one NAT. Where
only the IP addresses and the needed checksums are changed. These type of NATs
are used to interconnect networks with incompatible addressing schemes. One of
such scenarios is two private networks sharing the same network prefix. The second
form is one-to-many NAT, where a single IP address can be mapped to multiple
addresses. This is the type of NAT that is used in most scenarios. One such scenario
is a home-network where Internet Service Provider (ISP) provides single IP-address
and this is NATed to allow all customer’s devices to connect to the Internet.
One-to-many NATs generally fall under a few types. Translation is mapped when
an outgoing connection is established. With a full-cone NAT when a connection
from an internal address-port pair is made all traffic to the external address-port
pair is sent to same internal pair and the outgoing traffic goes via external pair.
Address-restricted full-cone differs in only allowing traffic from an address if there
has been outgoing traffic. The port-restricted cone NAT further limits the incoming
traffic to the exact pairs that have had communication. A symmetric NAT maps a
new external address and port for each connection and the incoming traffic must use
these.
When two hosts wanting to communicate with each other are behind separate
NATs process known as NAT Traversal is required. The most common methods for
this are Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN), Traversal Using Relays around
NAT (TURN) and Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE).[29][30][31]
The NAT cannot support all types of applications and might require Application
Layer Gateways (ALG) to operate. One such case is the Active mode of FTP
described in Section 2.10.2. In this mode, the client connecting to the server expects
the server to connect back but to a different port. This, however, is not possible as
the NAT only has a mapping for the outgoing connection. An ALG is needed to
monitor the traffic and to do operations on the packets for the protocol to operate.
With such help, the protocols requiring incoming connections can operate.
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Often devices providing NAT have support for Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) which allows automatic allocation of IP address.[32] These IP
addresses are provided dynamically from a pool by a router and have set expiration
time requiring occasional renewing. The process allows connecting hosts to new
networks without configuring a static IP address to them. It is another way for ISPs
to conserve their IP resources as often the customers do not use all of the addresses
they are allowed.
3.2 Inherent security weaknesses of IP networks
IP networks have inherent security weaknesses. These often stem from its early
design as a network between trusted hosts. IP protocol itself is weak against spoofing,
a process of masquerading as some other host which is possible just by changing the
source IP address of the packet. As there are no other identifiers the receiving host
cannot discern the origin of the packet.
TCP protocol relies heavily on sequence numbers. This opens it to two types of
attacks. If the initial sequence number generation is easily guessed it is possible to
spoof the ACK packet to complete the handshake and have the receiving host to
believe that traffic originates from a different host. Another way is to use FIN or
RST packets to close existing connections from a host.
ICMP is also a potential avenue of attack. Spoofed redirect messages can be
used to direct traffic to malicious gateways and thus allow their capture or alteration.
Denial of Service is also possible with these packets.
3.3 Common attacks
Common attacks can be divided to a few types relevant of which we present here.
Some attacks can cover multiple types like the presented distributed denial of service.
3.3.1 Spoofing
Spoofing is the process where attacker masquerades as another host. Common attack
type is generating IP packets with wrong source IP. While this does not allow the
sender of the datagram to communicate, with connectionless protocols it can allow
other types of attacks as many protocols do not authenticate the sender in any way.
On the other hand, with rightly timed attacks processes can be disturbed, such as
FIN packet with sufficiently close values to real ones closing a TCP connection. They
are also used in DoS to prevent auditing of the original sender.
3.3.2 Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DoS) is a type of an attack where the attacker tries to overwhelm the
target system with traffic or requests. Simply sending enough traffic to a host on the
Internet can use all of their available bandwidth capacity and thus prevent legitimate
communication. On the other hand, DOS is also a useful test for discovering limits
of the system under test.
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One common type of DoS is Distributed DoS, or DDoS where traffic originates
from multiple sources. Compromised devices with malware capable of controlling
them are known as bots and with controlling nodes in a network form botnets. Use
of poorly secured Internet of Things (IoT) devices has also happened.
The amount of traffic that a single device can generate can be increased with
amplification attacks, where protocols and servers that generate larger response than
the sent message are used with spoofing. The DNS system is an example of such a
system where a small request can generate a much larger response. Spoofing happens
by using victim’s address in the query to the powerful servers with high bandwidth,
which then flood victim with large amount of responses.
In 2014 and 2015 Network Time Protocol has been used in this type of attack,
where MONLIST command returning last 600 clients IPs was used[33].
TCP SYN Flood is a type of attack that utilizes lower traffic volume and instead
aims to starve resources of the target. In the opening of a TCP connection the side
receiving connection has an half-open connection state for that connection. Having
too many of these states can limit the system from receiving new connections thus
denying service from other legitimate parties.
3.3.3 Brute force and dictionary
Accessing a system normally requires right credentials. One way to attain such
is just to guess usernames and matching passwords. In process of brute forcing
attacker simply tries password after password such as aaa, aab, aac and so on. This,
however, becomes exponentially more difficult as password length and character set
increase, 4 digit pin code has ten thousand different possible combinations whereas
4 lowercase letters have almost four hundred thousand combinations and 5 letters
nearly ten million combinations. As such more refined techniques are better suited.
One such is dictionary attacks where popular passwords and words are stored and
used. Dictionaries being much smaller, than are combinations of characters and are
faster to use and require less time.
3.3.4 Buffer overflow and injections
If the attacker has further goals than just preventing the system from communicating
an access to the system is needed. The process of brute forcing at login often leaves
marks and is easily discovered and stopped. Attacking weaknesses in a system and
programs is often an effective way to gain access or information.
A common weakness on the web is poorly coded and protected fields. An attacker
can inject in these fields database query code which gets executed and then can leak
contents of the database to the attacker, such as usernames, passwords, emails and
other details of the users. Even if hashing is utilized with passwords, attacker has an
opportunity to try brute-forcing them in leisure.
Buffer overflow is an attack where a certain amount of space is reserved by a
program, but more is erroneously written. This allows attackers to modify memory
outside intended allocation. In certain cases, it is possible to write arbitrary machine
code to memory which then can get executed. The code in question can allow the
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attacker execute programs or code allowing him to gain a better access to system
and thus work further from that point.
3.4 Encryption, encoding and hashing
Encryption is the process of coding information or data, with the goal of preventing
unauthorized parties from reading it. Hashing is the process of generating fixed-
length data from arbitrary length data in a non-reversible, but repeatable process.
Encoding is the process of converting data from one format to another.
Hashing
Hashing is used to generate probabilistically unique fixed sized mappings of arbitrary
sized data. The process allows generating so called fingerprints from inputs. Hashing
of the passwords is a common use case. Good password hash functions are not
reversible, which means that input can not easily be generated from output. As such
even if the hash of the password is leaked the attacker cannot discern the password
from the hash while verifying the provided password is easy. One other use case is
hashing messages or entire files to verify their integrity. Hash-functions and hashes
are used this way to offer an extra layer of security.
Public key cryptography and infrastructure
Public-key cryptography is a way to achieve confidentiality in communication. It
consists of a system where two keys, public and private, are generated. A message
can be encrypted using the public key and then decrypted only using the private key.
This allows confidentiality and integrity of data between communication partners.
Digital signing is the process of using the private key to generate an output, which
is verifiable with the corresponding public key, from a message. Generally, to save
space the message is hashed and the hash is signed instead.
Public key infrastructure (PKI) is built on the public-key cryptography. The
main component of PKI is the certificates. They are documents issued by trusted
third parties containing the identity and the public key of an entity with information
signed by the trusted third party. This makes possible to transfer trust. The trusted
party guarantees the authenticity of the entity who they provide a certificate to
and the signature process proves the integrity of the certificate. The most prevalent
use case is the web, where secure connections are formed by using public keys in
certificates.
Encoding
Base64 is an example of encoding scheme standardized in RFC 4648.[34] In base64
binary data of 8-bit bytes is encoded limited character set of a-Z, A-Z, 0-9, / and +
while using = for padding. This process allows transferring arbitrary data as a text
which most systems should be able to handle.
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3.5 Software testing
"Testing is the process of executing a program with the intent of finding errors"[35].
Black-box testing or data-driven testing is an method where internal structure and
the behaviour of a program is not the concern, but focus is finding circumstances
where program does not follow the specifications. In exhaustive input testing, all
possible inputs in some range are tested. However, testing all the valid and invalid
inputs results in near infinite number of test cases.[35]
White-box or logic-driven testing allows examination of internal structure of the
program. As such the strategy could be to build tests that execute all statements
in the code at least once, which is also known as exhaustive path testing. However,
even in this case, the possible code paths in complex program is astronomical.[35]
Regression testing is software testing done with the aim of guaranteeing that
changes made in software do not change the working functionality of the program.
This type of testing can be automated and run every time when changes have been
made to a system.
3.5.1 Fuzz testing
Fuzz testing is a technique used to find errors in software products. It can be used to
test both programs and protocol implementations. Fuzz testing is easily automated
and can provide test cases that are not usually considered by the testers. Fuzz testing
is an additional tool but does not replace traditional testing or guarantee that all
the issues are found.
Fuzz testing allows automated testing of systems against a wide range of incorrect
inputs. Incorrect inputs can often result in critical vulnerabilities and bugs such
as buffer overruns, crashes, memory leaks and unhandled exceptions. In this sense,
functional testing is a subset of data-driven testing where the approach is to aim at
edges of valid input base or take a valid input and modify it and check the results.
It can be generally divided into a few categories: random, mutation, template or
protocol based.
The simplest form of fuzz testing is the random testing. Where entirely random
inputs of varying lengths are generated as inputs. It can find situations where invalid
inputs are handled incorrectly causing issues. In mutation based fuzz testing known
valid inputs are used and modified slightly. Generation or template based methods
use pre-defined templates where format or specification of data is known and values
are generated in these constraints.
CVE-2014-0160 or Hearthbleed bug in OpenSSL is an example of bug found with
fuzz testing by Codenomicon, a company producing fuzz testing tools. The bug
could lead to leaking of information in the memory of OpenSSL such as private keys,
passwords and email-addresses.
The weakness was in the handling of inputs and memory allocations. TLS/SSL
has a feature where the client sends a message and server responds by sending the
same message back. The request includes the length of the message and the server
allocates this much memory for the message, however, the message sent by the client
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was shorter than the length indicated. This difference resulted in the server sending
data beyond the message provided, which likely included previously used data.
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4 Systems under test
In this section we present the systems we are testing. First in what type of environment
we are running them and then components of these environments. After this we
shortly present the CESv1 and CESv2 we tested.
4.1 Test enviroment
All tests were done in Virtual Machines (VM) with Oracle VM VirtualBox version
5.0.28 r111378 running under 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 LTS operating system, on a
machine with four core Intel i5-6500 @3.20 GHz Central Processing Unit (CPU),
8GB of ram and 500GB traditional HDD.
Virtualisation was chosen as nothing in the system necessitated direct access to
hardware and it allowed simulating multiple hosts on a single computer. Additionally
it provided opportunities for fast iteration low risks from breaking stuff as well as
backing up and restoring and later entirely rebuilding the test environment was
quick. With new iptables CES it also allowed easily transferable environment as
configurations could be updated and transferred allowing building the same system
by any developer.
4.1.1 CES version 1
For the earlier CES version Proxmox Virtual Environment version 3.4-11/6502936f
was provided with two cores and 2048MB of ram inside the VirtualBox, Vt-X, Nested
Paging and PAE/NX were turned on. Three network adapters were also configured,
Host-only Adapter, NAT and Internal Network. Containers themselves run Ubuntu
14.04.3 LTS (GNU/Linux 2.6.32-40-pve x86_64).
Containter: Memory: Swap Role:
cesa 128 MB 128 MB CESA
cesa-ext 128 MB 128 MB DNS for CESA
cesb 128 MB 128 MB CESB
cesb-ext 128 MB 128 MB DNS for CESB
public-dns 256 MB 128 MB main DNS
public1 512 MB 64 MB public host
public2 64 MB 64 MB second public host
hosta1 128 MB 64 MB host behind CESA
hosta2 64 MB 64 MB second host behind CESA
hostb1 512 MB 64 MB host behind CESB
Table 4.1: List of containers run for testing.
List of containers run can be found in Table 4.1. Two instances of the CES were run
one on container cesa and one on cesb, connected to these were containers cesa-ext
29
and cesb-ext respectively providing DNS relays to CES instances. Connected to the
cesa were hosts hosta1 and hosta2 and to cesb hostb1. The test involving hosts
behind the CES primarily used hosta1. Hosta1, hosta2 and hostb1 communicated
to public network via the CES they were connected to. The container public-dns
provided dns services. The public1 was primary container used in testing to run
tools required for attacks.
4.1.2 CES version 2
For CES version 2 up to date Lubuntu 16.04 LTS virtual machine was used. The
VM was provided with 4096MB of memory and VT-x, Nested Paging and PAE/NX
was turned on. VM was also configured with a single NATed network adapter for
Internet connectivity.
Containter: Bridge: Address:
router br-wan0 100.64.0.1/24
resolver br-wan0 100.64.0.2/24
public br-wan0 100.64.0.100/24
br-wan0 br-wan0 100.64.0.254/24
router br-wan1 100.64.1.1/24
gwa br-wan1 100.64.1.130-(142)/24
router br-wan2 100.64.2.1/24
gwb br-wan2 100.64.2.130-(142)/24
gwa br-lan0a 192.168.0.1/24
test_gwa br-lan0b 192.168.0.100(-250)/24
gwb br-lan0a 192.168.0.1/24
test_gwb br-lan0b 192.168.0.100(-250)/24
Table 4.2: List of lxc-containers and the bridges they are connected to and their
addresses
The test network was set up using lxc-containers. A custom orchestration envi-
ronment was used to generate 7 containers: router, resolver, public, gwa, gwb,
test_gwa and test_gwb. The system allowed automatic building of the test system.
In the building process multiple packages are installed automatically in a base con-
tainer ctbase with some common configurations, SSH key files and test files are
included. This container is then cloned in listed and individual configurations for
networking and starting required services are set up. Additionally, various scripts
are run at launch such as pulling the CES version 2 from git to gwa and gwb. Also
the namespaces for public, test_gwa and test_gwb are created.
Containers, the bridges they are connected to and their addresses can be seen in
Table 4.2. The br-wan0 is not a container, but a bridge offering a gateway to the host
system for connectivity to public Internet. Containers router, resolver and public
in the subnetwork 100.64.0.0/24 can connect directly via this. Router and gwa
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are in the subnetwork 100.64.1.0/24 and router and gwb are in the subnetwork
100.64.2.0/24. Both gwa and gwb have the addresses .130 and are designed to use
also addresses .131-142. Router acts as a gateway for both networks. In separate
private 192.168.0.0/24 networks are containers test_gwa and test_gwb with gwa
and gwb acting as gateways and as CES respectively. Test_gwa and test_gwb have
the address of .100 and network namespaces test101-test250 set to use address
.101-250. These namespaces can also request dynamic addresses with DHCP.
4.2 CES version 1
CES is a technology developed as a replacement for NATs and firewalls. It can
also include RGW a component that allows hosts behind a node to communicate
with public Internet. CES utilizes Customer Edge Traversal Protocol (CETP) to
communicate needed information of edge traversal process between CES devices
or nodes. Development of parts of the system has been presented in theses by
Jesus LLorente Santons, Maryam Pahlevan and Hammad Kabir.[36][37][38] Later
publications expand on these works and describe new findings and present a focus
on 5G.[39][40][41][42]
4.2.1 RGW
RGW is a component of the CES node which allows a host behind the node in a
private network to communicate with the hosts outside. RGW also contains the
ALGs which allow the protocols like SIP and FTP to operate. When hosts behind a
node try to communicate to outside the RGW acts like NAT.[36]
For incoming traffic the RGW has a novel way of operating. It has a pool of
IP addresses, which are allocated in a circular manner. For a connection to be
established a DNS query is required against an FQDN of a host behind the node.
When a query is received, a reply with the next IP address from the circular
pool is sent. The node sets a waiting state for this IP address allowing a single
connection to it. After the connection is established, the following packets in the
flow are translated and the address is returned to the pool. This process allows edge
routing to happen and the host in private network to be accessible from outside
unlike with traditional NAT.
The circular pool is open to at least two types of attacks. Circular pools can be
exhausted as a single query reserves an address for a time. Multiple queries can thus
be generated to stop anyone from resolving the FQDNs of hosts behind the node.
DNS records are not cached due to TTL being 0. The IP address in replies are also
transient and only available for a short time. Another type of attack the system is
susceptible towards is hijacking where the attacker tries to send packets to claim an
address in a waiting state. To stop this the RGW has a bot detection system.
4.2.2 CETP
CES nodes communicate using the CETP protocol. The protocol is a binary protocol
utilizing fixed header and number of Type Length Value (TLV) elements. There
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are two types of TLVs Control and Payload, a single CETP message can contain
multiple control TLVs. The version of protocol presented below is from Hammad
Kabir’s thesis with some information updated to latest available version.[38]
The CETP consist of two planes control and data plane. Control plane is used
to communicate signalling information between nodes and data plane is used for
encapsulated data traffic. The CETP utilizes policies for negotiation of trust and
setting up communication channels.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
VERS C P Header Length Reserved SSTLen DSTLen
Source Session Tag - SST
Destination Session Tag - DST
CETP Control TLVs or Payload TLV
Figure 4.1: CETP Header
CETP protocol messages always has the header, presented in Figure 4.1, and one
or more Control TLVs or single Payload TLV with the possibility of some Control
TLVs. In the 32-bit fixed header, there is a 3-bit version field, 2 for this version,
1-bit C and P flags used to indicate the presence of Control or Payload TLVs. Header
length is 11 bits, followed by 8-bits of reserved space and two 4-bit fields for Source
Session Tag Length (SSTLen) and Destination Session Tag Length (DSTLen).
Following these are SST and DST fields and the payload. The header length stores
the length of header and control TLVs. SSTLen and DSTLen store SST and DST lengths
in 4-byte words.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Oper Cmp Ext Group Code TLV-Length
TLV-Value
Figure 4.2: CETP Control TLV
CETP control TLV is presented in Figure 4.2. A control TLV has 16 bits for type
information, 16 bit for Length and variable sized payload padded to 32 bits. The
first 2 bits are for operation: query, response or information. The next 2 bits for
compatibility to indicate nodes capabilities: available, not available, not required
or required. The 2 extension bits are for future extensions. The 3 bit group value
indicates the general type of TLV: identification, payload, resource location (rloc),
control or mobility. The last 7 bits of this two octet group are for the code of the TLV,
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which are listed as constants for CETPLibrary in the Appendix B. In Figure 4.3
and Figure 4.4 the TLVs for payloads for use of CETP dataplane are presented.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Oper Cmp Ext Group Code TLV-Length
Mobility DSCP/QoS Ext Protocol Type
Payload
Figure 4.3: CETP Payload TLV for Ethernet encapsulation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Oper Cmp Ext Group Code TLV-Length
Mobility DSCP/QoS EtherType
Payload
Figure 4.4: CETP Payload TLV for IPv4/IPv6 encapsulation
Most CETP communications consist of establishing a trust between hosts and
negotiating a communication channel. Trust establishing happens by exchange of
certificates and signatures. In the most basic case, on behalf of connecting host CES
sends a message with its certificate and signature and a query for certificate and
signature. The signature is a TLV with a hash of the message as a hexstring signed
with the private key of the certificate attached.
After the trust has been established the CES nodes try to negotiate a matching
policy based on policies stored in them. The policies include details of what they
offer, require and what is available. These are usually the identifier, rloc and payload.
4.3 CES version 2
CES version 2 was released during the process of writing this thesis. The CES version
1 was not going to be developed further, rather it is seen as a proof of concept that
has already served its purpose. CESv2 includes the ideas of CES but its approach is
from a different direction. The main change is leveraging Linux kernel’s iptables. The
whole approach for the design from our view is use of the standardised technologies
and clear separations of responsibilities. Thus designing a system where individual
components are easily replaceable and could be in the future provided by different
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vendors.
The iptables based approach allows the use of ubiquitous technologies already
implemented and well tested for the required task. The iptables is a chain and
table based firewall. This structure allows a fine-grained setting of rules for various
goals. In addition, iptables allows marking of packets in flows and handling them
based on these marks. Additionally, it allows processing chosen packets in user
space with user-written programs. This is where the important step of CES packet
handling happens, only new incoming connection packets are handled with CES
code. After this any further packets can be processed with iptables. Other important
design changes are use of python3, asyncio and SYNPROXY. The system uses
iptables firewall rules and supports grouping users behind policies and users having
individually set policies with the aim of developing a system to generate these policies
and store them in a separate service for retrieval to any CES that the user connects
to.
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5 Tools
In this chapter, we describe the tools used in the work. First, we describe the
Robot Framework on which we build our solution. After that, we present our work:
CETPLibrary.py and CETPLibrary. In Chapter 7 we present results achieved by
using it. Finally, we describe the tools we used in other parts of our work.
5.1 Robot Framework
Robot Framework, later in this section just RF or the framework, is an automated
testing framework. Originally it was presented in a Master’s thesis at Helsinki
University of Technology by Pekka Laukkanen and was later adopted by Nokia.[43]
The framework is keyword driven. The framework is written in Python. It has
excellent report and documentation generation functionalities. In many cases it is
heavily Unicode based and as such have very good textual capabilities.[44]
Robot Framework code consist of cells that are separated by either double spaces
or space-pipe-space structures. Lines can be in some cases extended with three dots.
5.1.1 Test case styles
Robot Framework supports three different ways of building test cases. In the keyword-
driven approach some state is initiated, something is done and finally state is checked.
Examples of keyword written in this style can be seen in Listing 5.2. In the example,
we open a connection then try to log in and finally check if our login was successful.
The test can potentially fail at any point.
Next is data-driven approach where we provide a keyword that accepts parameters
as a template. This template can then be easily fed with multiple different parameters
to easily iterate over multiple cases.
Finally Given/When/Then/And/But prefixes are used in a behaviour-driven style
which allows setting initial condition given, when something is done and something
else is done resulting in then something happening.
5.1.2 Variable types
Robot Framework supports 4 variable types scalar, list, dictionary and environment.
Each variable is inside {} and denoted with symbol $ for scalar, @ list, & dictionary
and % for environment.
Scalar variables alone in a cell are used as is and in a cell they are converted to
Unicode presentation and catenated together.
List variables can be used in multiple ways. With $ they are used as scalar
variables. With @ the values inside are passed as different arguments. Individual
items can be also accessed with [] notation.
Dictionary variables can also be used in multiple ways. As with list $ treats them
as single scalar value. If named arguments are used with keywords they can also be
passed used with &. It is also possible to access items inside a dictionary with []
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and the key in a similar way to list variables. It should be noted that dictionaries
can only be followed by named arguments or other dictionaries.
5.1.3 Files, tables and settings
In the Framework, files can be roughly classified in resource files, variable files, test
case files and initialization files. Where resource files generally contain keyword
definitions and variable definitions. Variable files allow importing variables from
code files. Initialization files are mainly for test suite related settings as they cannot
contain test and keywords and variables are not available in lower level test suites.
Test case files contain the tests and form a test suite.
There are four different tables used in robot framework noted with *** ***.
These tables are Settings, Variables, Keywords and Test Cases. Keywords and
Variables mainly exist in Resource files, test cases only in test case files and
settings can be in initialization files. A single table can contain unlimited amount
entries. In test case and keyword tables the settings are noted with square-brackets.
Settings table is used to import resources with Resource, Libraries with Library
and variables from variable files with Variables. Setting tables can also contain
documentation, metadata and default or forced tags. It allows setting suite and
test setup and teardown keywords. Additionally, it is used for test case template
and timeout functionality.
Test case tables contain one or more of the test cases. Each test case can have
its own settings for documentation, tags, setup, teardown, template and timeout.
These settings override or extend the ones set in Settings table.
Keywords table contains keywords which can have settings for documentation,
tags, arguments, return, teardown and timeout. An example of this can be found
in Listing 5.2 where we provide arguments to keywords and the keywords return
variables containing connection identifier.
5.1.4 Libraries
The main way to extend more complex capabilities of the Framework is the use of li-
braries. The framework offers a few standard libraries: BuiltIn, Dialogs, DateTime,
Collections, OperatingSystem, Process, Remote, Screenshot, String, Telnet
and XML. We list the libraries used in the work in this chapter. Additionally, there
are some external specific purpose libraries such as SSHLibrary and many others
like libraries for testing and interacting with HTTP, FTP, Android, Database and
Django. There is also the library Rammbock for generic network protocol testing.
BuiltIn
BuiltIn is a standard library containing generic keywords which are often needed.
It offers very basic logic checks to verify conditions and running keywords in various
ways like Run Keyword If. Common use cases are checking output strings with
Should Contain and Should Not Be Equal. It also has functionality for setting
variables Set global variable. Other basic uses are conversions like Convert To
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Integer, logging with Log, basic catenation using Catenate, and commands like
Sleep.
String, DateTime, Collection
String, DateTime and Collections are other examples of standard libraries. The
String library contains keywords for more special string manipulation than the
BuiltIn, for example, keywords for splitting strings, checking and changing the
case and replacing or removing parts of a substring. DateTime contains keywords
for creating, verifying and doing calculations with date and time values. And
Collections with keywords for the list and dictionary handling which are the data
structures of the Framework.
SSHLibrary
SSHLibrary is an external library useful for communicating with remote servers
using SSH. It can be used to manage SSH connections with keywords like Open
Connection, Switch Connection and Close Connection. It allows login on servers
using Login or with key using Login With Public Key. The main use for us were
the keywords Execute Command for running a command in a new terminal and
reading output once execution is finished, Start Command for running a command
and then using Read Command Output for reading output. The other way to achieve
this is Write and Read which directly write and read to commandline. For reading,
there are also commands like Read Until Prompt and Read Until Regexp if a more
specific functionality is desired. SSHlibrary also supports basic file system access
with commands like Get File, List Directory, List Files In directory, File
Should Exist, Directory Should Not Exist.
Remote
Remote is a special case of the libraries. It does not have its own keywords but instead
is a special library allowing connecting to Libraries running on the remote severs.
It acts as a proxy and provides keywords running on the server to be used in test
suites. An example of use is Library Remote http://192.168.254.112:25400,
which links the Library Remote to the given address allowing accessing keywords
on that server.
RF can be extended with Libraries written in Python. If the framework is run
on Jython it is also possible to use Java.[44] Excerpt from CETPLibrary.py which
we developed can be seen in Listing 5.1. In the excerpt we define a simple function
and show how RobotRemoteServer is used.
class CETPLibrary(object ):
def append_certificate_tlv(self , certFileName , tlvs=None):
f = open(certFileName)
cert = f.read()
f.close()
tlv = self.new_tlv_dictionary (2, 0, 0, 3, 12, cert)
return self.append_tlv(tlv , tlvs)
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if __name__ == ’__main__ ’:
import sys
from robotremoteserver import RobotRemoteServer
RobotRemoteServer(CETPLibrary (), host=sys.argv[1],
port=sys.argv[2], allow_stop=True)
Listing 5.1: Excerpt from CETPLibrary.py
The function presented simply takes a file name and potential list of tlvs, reads
the file provided, generates a new tlv where it sets relevant values and appends it to
the list and returns that list. A use case of the function can be found in Appendix C.
In the name of the function, the underscores correspond to spaces in keywords.
Parameters and return value can be used directly in the RF code.
If the file is run as the main function, the lower part is entered. Where we
import sys for getting command line parameters. RobotRemoteServer is imported
to run the library as remote server. The function is called with library’s class
name, command line parameters providing IP address and the port and parameter
for allowing stopping. The process does everything needed for starting a server,
reading and communicating keywords and taking care of communication between
the Framework and the server using XML/RPC.
5.1.5 User keywords
User-written keywords are the main way to extend the framework’s capabilities and
allow easy reuse of the code. In Listing 5.2 we present a few the keywords from
our developed testing framework. With original work done by K.C. Amir in his
thesis.[45] Later expanded by the author.
*** Settings ***
Documentation Library for general RGW/CES operation and use.
Library SSHLibrary
Resource global_variables.robot
*** Keywords ***
Log In
[Arguments] ${HOSTNAME} ${USERNAME} ${PASSWORD}
${conn} Open Connection ${HOSTNAME}
${output} = SSHLibrary.Login ${USERNAME} ${PASSWORD}
Should Contain ${output} Welcome
[Return] ${conn}
Log In with Dict
[Arguments] &{ LogInfo}
${conn} Open Connection &{ LogInfo }[host]
${output} = SSHLibrary.Login &{ LogInfo }[ username] &{ LogInfo }[ password]
Should Contain ${output} Welcome
[Return] ${conn}
Log In as Root with key
[Arguments] ${HOSTNAME}
${conn} Open Connection ${HOSTNAME}
${output} Login with public key root ${KeyFile}
Should Contain ${output} Welcome
[Return] ${conn}
Listing 5.2: User created keyword in Robot Framework, part of global_lib.robot
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In the example we see our usual approach of first providing documentation and
importing relevant resources in settings table, in this case, the SSHLibrary and
variable file. Log In keyword is our base case of taking as arguments the server’s
address and user credentials. After this, we open a new connection to the server
and store its identifier in conn variable. Next, we try to login on the server using
SSHLibrary’s keyword Login and checking the output containing word Welcome to
indicate successful login. Finally, we return the connection variable for later use.
Log In with Dict was our attempt for less verbosity by utilizing a dictionary
to have single variable instead of multiple. This approach, however, was not fruitful
due to the framework’s handling of dictionary variables with other variables. Log In
as Root with key uses key based authentication where we simply open connection
and try to login as root with key provide in variable KeyFile containing path and
file name to a ssh-key.
5.2 CETPLibrary
In this section we describe our work on CETPLibrary. First we cover our general
design decisions and the thought process behind these. Then we provide some more
specific details about implementation.
5.2.1 Design decisions
As discussed before the existing libraries for Robot Framework even for protocol
generation are limited. Rammbock is an example of a library we would and very likely
would have supported the type of protocol that CETP is and had some existing
example relating to DNS which would have allowed more complex systems to be
build. However, it did not support protocols directly over IP which we needed for
CETP implementation.
The need of raw sockets to send data was found to be a key problem in general.
They were needed as the protocol required a setting of IP protocol field to 254.
Additionally, these types of sockets require root privileges which with other good
practices made general development more complex as a direct iteration of code on
non-root users was not possible. Using the root account for general use is considered
bad practise.
Robot Framework allows developing libraries in multiple languages, but as most of
the development this far had been done in Python it was chosen for implementation
of the library too. With Python there are multiple libraries available even for the
type of networking needed, but they involved a lot of overhead and we found our
problem to be simple. The approach allowed us to use our own data-structures which
interlinked into Robot Framework nicely.
5.2.2 CETPLibrary.py
For testing CETP-protocol with Robot Framework CETPLibrary.py was written
with an example provided in Listing 5.1. Documentation of CETPLibrary’s keywords
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can be found in Appendix A. The library extends the framework and it can be used
with Remote library.
CETPLibrary was developed to allow the generation of relevant packets. It allowed
writing test cases in Robot Framework for generation of headers and TLVs with
chosen fields. It has functionality for fuzzing any of the fields and potentially allow
encapsulating traffic. It was used for generating packets for testing edge cases. Vasic
security exchange was implemented utilizing it in Robot Framework.
In the development it was found that XML/RPC does not operate correctly
with our binary data. As such base64 encoding was chosen to pass around the
data between Robot Framework and library running on a remote host. Core data
structures of CETPLibrary are the Header and the TLV dictionaries later of which
also utilized in the lists containing all of the TLVs of a single message. This approach
allows us to set any of the protocols fields to desired values. Additionally, we have
keywords for reading the certificate files and private key files and generating the
valid certificate and signature TLVs, for which we utilized M2Crypto-library which
was also used in CESv1.
On the other hand, we have the various keywords for network communication.
These exist usually in both B64, for base64, and non-B64 names as mentioned before
XML/RPC did not act nicely with our binary data. We developed functions for both
sending and receiving IP packets. Additionally, we developed keywords for encoding
and decoding our dictionaries to relevant bytes.
5.2.3 CETP_lib.robot
CETP_lib.robot found in Appendix B is our generic resource file which contains
the known constants of CETP protocol and a few useful keyword. These constants
are grouped and prefixed in such a way that we have OPE for operations, CMP for
compatibility, Ext for extensions, GRP for group and then various code groups: CRLOC
for RLOC, CPL for payload, CCTRL for control and CID for id. In the keywords table,
we have a few basic keywords. Setup is used to create a new rawsocket at the
initialization of communication.
Send Message takes in the header dictionary containing the desired payload and
source and destination addresses. Then it converts the whole header into bytes,
which are encoded to base64 and then sent via the socket.
Add TLVs and Add TLVs and signature are for adding tlvs to headers. The
latter utilizes the first one for this purpose. Add TLVs takes in a header dictionary
and the list of tlvs converts the list to bytes which are base64 encoded. Is then used
to modify headers value field, after which the length field in the header is updated
to match. Adding signature works by doing above, calculating the signature using
provided private key from the CETP packet and then appending the new tlv list to
replace the old one.
Perform Security Handshake is used to complete security negotiation using
most basic policy. It takes in source and destination addresses, certificate file name
and private key file name. Then it creates the header with correct values and two
query TLVs for signature and certificate. Next, it appends the certificate it reads
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from the provided file to a TLV list and then appends to this list the mentioned
query tlvs. Next, it uses Add TLVs and signature to append correct signature and
sends this message from 198.18.0.112 to 198.18.0.10 our fixed testing addresses.
After this, it receives a response message and decodes it to header and tlvs.
5.3 Software and tools
In this section we describe the relevant tools and software we used. All the work was
done on Linux. In addition to those listed below we would like to mention nginx as
the web server and vsftp as the FTP server. To provide general DNS services in
the environments bind9 was used in both and dnsmasq in the version 2.
Secure Shell SSH and Secure Copy Protocol
Secure Shell (SSH) is a popular protocol and a tool offering encrypted communications.
It supports both password and key-based authentications. Thus it allows an easy
automation with suitable frameworks.
Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) allows copying files between remote hosts. It operates
over SSH. SCP allows both copying from initiating host to remote host and from
remote host to initiating host. In addition, it allows copying files from remote to
remote host.
5.3.1 Wireshark packet dissector and analyzer
Wireshark is a popular suite of tools used to capture and analyse network traffic. By
default, it supports dissection of multiple protocols such as Ethernet, IP, TCP, UDP,
DNS, HTTP, FTP and ICMP. It is also extensible with user writeable plug-ins for
adding support for new protocols. As there was a need to easily analyse CETP traffic
and packets such dissector was needed. Thankfully a version was already written by
my advisor Hammad Kabir as a special assignment. In the use of the dissector a
bug was found, where a too small variable was used for TLV length, which was fixed.
Later the plugin was updated to better match the current state of the protocol as it
was originally made for an older version. Plug-in also was specifically compiled for
Wireshark 1.8.2 the version already installed in Proxmox environment. Matching the
version was important as later versions had changes in architecture making plug-ins
compiled in them incompatible with the version installed.
In Figure 5.1 a screenshot of Wireshark with the plugin is presented. In it, we
can see how dissectors such as DNS are available by default and provide information
about packets. We can also see filtering options at the top where we have chosen
only to show DNS and CETP packets. Next, we can see the list of packets with their
ordinal number, the relative timestamp from first packet, source and destination
addresses, protocol, size and info containing dissected information.
Next in the Figure 5.1 we can see more detailed information of a packet. More
information of the relevant layer can be shown. In the image layers, are the pseudo
frame from virtual bridge vmbr102, Ethernet, IP and CETP. We can see the structure
of CETP packet here, with first being flags and header length, followed by the
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Figure 5.1: Wireshark with CETP dissector plug-in
reserved value, source and session tag lengths and the source session tag.
After this, there are 4 CETP TLV values. The tool especially shines in easy viewing
of bit values in TLVs and their lengths. We can see which flags are set and what
type of TLV is in question. Additionally, due to work done on the dissector we can
a see simple overview of TLV in the form of Operation, Group and relating Code
translated. At the end, we can see the hex dump of the packet, with selected field
coloured.
5.3.2 Commands: time, watch and tail
In Listing 5.4 we see an example of the use of time command. The time, in this case,
is a build in function of bash command prompt. The time can be used to tell how
long it took for a command to run. In the example the command run for 11 minutes
42 seconds. It can be also used as a manual timing tool as the command run can
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be terminated by issuing interrupt signal with Ctrl+C combination in the terminal.
Time command also shows the system time spent in executing a command so it can
potentially be used to discover resources usage.
An example of use of Linux’s watch tool is seen in Listing 5.6. Watch tool allows
running a command repeatedly. The flag -n detonates an interval in second how
often a command is run. The watch runs a command and shows the output.
The tail command allows tracking of lines appended to files. It can either be used
to print new lines since the last run or continuously print the added lines to console.
5.3.3 Network bandwidth measurement: iperf
iperf is a bandwidth measurement tool. It allows testing raw bandwidth between a
server and a client. It also supports various options for tuning the testing such as
TCP or UDP mode, multiple parallel connections, setting congestion algorithms on
Linux, choosing the amount of data transferred and time test runs. An example of a
run of the tool can be found in Listing 5.3, where first we see starting the server and
its output and the next the running of client and output produced. The addresses
and ports used are listed with the time, the transferred data and the bandwidth
observed.
root@test_gwa :~# iperf -s
------------------------------------------------------------
Server listening on TCP port 5001
TCP window size: 85.3 KByte (default)
------------------------------------------------------------
[ 4] local 192.168.0.100 port 5001 connected with 100.64.0.100 port 35120
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bandwidth
[ 4] 0.0 -10.0 sec 31.7 GBytes 27.2 Gbits/sec
root@public :~# iperf -c test.gwa.demo
------------------------------------------------------------
Client connecting to test.gwa.demo , TCP port 5001
TCP window size: 85.0 KByte (default)
------------------------------------------------------------
[ 3] local 100.64.0.100 port 35120 connected with 100.64.1.134 port 5001
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bandwidth
[ 3] 0.0 -10.0 sec 31.7 GBytes 27.2 Gbits/sec
Listing 5.3: Use case of: iperf server and client
5.3.4 Packet generator and port scanner: hping3
hping3 is a tool allowing the generation of various types of packets including IP,
ICMP, UDP and TCP for port scanning and other purposes. It can be used for basic
port scanning, or just generating packets in general with various options set at very
high speeds and as such being a very good generic tool for testing DoS attacks.
root@public1 :~# time hping3 hosta1.demo.lte -d 1460 -i u2000 -c 300000
HPING hosta1.demo.lte (wan0 198.18.0.11): NO FLAGS are set , 40 headers +
1460 data bytes
len =40 ip =198.18.0.11 ttl=63 DF id=0 sport=0 flags=RA seq=0 win=0 rtt =23.5 ms
--- hosta1.demo.lte hping statistic ---
300000 packets transmitted , 1 packets received , 100% packet loss
round -trip min/avg/max = 23.5/23.5/23.5 ms
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real 11m42 .188s
user 0m6.730s
sys 0m46 .470s
Listing 5.4: Use case of: hping3 tool
An example of a run of the tool is presented in Listing 5.4. In command the
hosta1.demo.lte refers to target host, -d 1460 to amount of data sent in a packet,
-i u2000 for the interval between packets in microseconds and -c 300000 for the
number of packets. Interval of 2000 microseconds corresponds to 500 packets in a
second.
5.3.5 DNS enumeration tools: dnsrecon and dnsenum
dnsrecon is a powerful tool allowing brute forcing of records under domain by using
a dictionary. Additionally, it allows enumerating srv records, reverse look up of
ranges, google searches for sub domains and hosts, performing zone transfers and
testing if the domain is under any other top level domain.
Use of the tool to brute force hosts under demo.lte can be found in Listing 5.5,
where the time command is used to time how long the process took, -d option
for naming the domain, -t brt for brute force and -D for providing our dictionary
names.txt.mod. Additionally -n could be used for the address of the nameserver. In
the example dnsrecon has found the nameservers under the domain and 4 different
hosts with AAAA records.
root@public1 :~# time dnsrecon -d demo.lte -t brt -D ~/ names.txt.mod
[*] Performing host and subdomain brute force against demo.lte
[*] A ns1.demo.lte 198.18.0.111
[*] A dns.demo.lte 198.18.0.111
[*] AAAA dns.demo.lte fd00:bbbb::c612:6f
[*] A hosta2.demo.lte 198.18.0.12
[*] AAAA hosta2.demo.lte fd00:bbbb ::10:11
[*] A hosta3.demo.lte 198.18.0.13
[*] AAAA hosta3.demo.lte fd00:bbbb ::10:12
[*] AAAA hosta1.demo.lte fd00:bbbb ::10:10
[*] AAAA hosta4.demo.lte fd00:bbbb ::10:13
[*] 9 Records Found
real 2m53 .304s
user 2m10 .688s
sys 0m27 .687s
Listing 5.5: Use case of: dnsrecon tool
Dnsenum is similar tool which additionally supports multi-threading and auto-
matically performing reverse look ups for found IP addresses. It is also much smarter
in real word scenarios where it can detect potential wild card names.
5.3.6 packet generator: sendip
The sendip is a tool that allows generating packets with either random data or
sending contents of files as packets. It allows simple crafting of packets using its build
in module system. Listing 5.6 presents the two use cases. In the first line we use the
watch command with 1-second interval to run the tool. The tool itself is set to generate
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480 bytes of random data, with using module IPv4, setting protocol to 254, source
IP address to 198.18.0.112 and destination IP address of 198.18.0.15. In
the second line we use it to send binary data stored in raw.bin containing test data.
watch -n 1 sendip -d r480 -p ipv4 -ip 254 -is 198.18.0.112 198.18.0.15
sendip -f raw.bin -p ipv4 -ip 254 -is 198.18.0.112 198.18.0.15
Listing 5.6: Use cases of: sendip tool
5.3.7 File retrieval from web: wget
wget is a common tool for scrapping websites. It can recursively download a webpage
and any sub-pages or images linked to. In Listing 5.7 we can see how it operates.
We provide it the site and flag -r for recursive mode. After this it downloads our
site index.php which contains multiple images and we can see how it downloads
them too, in listing we have omitted other images, but at the end we can see the
number of files, size of download and speed. wget also allows us to download items
over FTP which makes it a usable tool for testing network performance.
root@public :~# wget -r http :// www.test.gwa.demo/index.php
--2017-03-01 12:51:17 - - http ://www.test.gwa.demo/index.php
Resolving www.test.gwa.demo (www.test.gwa.demo )... 100.64.1.130
Connecting to www.test.gwa.demo (www.test.gwa.demo )|100.64.1.130|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent , awaiting response ... 200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/html]
Saving to: ’www.test.gwa.demo/index.php ’
www.test.gwa.demo/index.p [ <=> ] 637 --.-KB/s in 0s
2017 -03 -01 12:51:17 (101 MB/s) - ’www.test.gwa.demo/index.php ’ saved [637]
--2017-03-01 12:51:17 - - http ://www.test.gwa.demo/aalto.jpg
Reusing existing connection to www.test.gwa.demo :80.
HTTP request sent , awaiting response ... 200 OK
Length: 12086 (12K) [image/jpeg]
Saving to: ’www.test.gwa.demo/aalto.jpg ’
www.test.gwa.demo/aalto.j 100%[===================== >] 11.80K --.-KB/s in 0s
2017 -03 -01 12:51:17 (574 MB/s) - ’www.test.gwa.demo/aalto.jpg ’ saved [12086/12086]
FINISHED --2017-03-01 12:51:17 - -
Total wall clock time: 0.02s
Downloaded: 6 files , 827K in 0.001s (866 MB/s)
Listing 5.7: Use case of: wget
5.3.8 FTP-client: tnftp
tnftp is an FTP client for Linux ported from NetBSD open-source Unix-like operating
system. It was chosen as a test client for its support of IPv6 and support for both
active and passive modes of FTP. Supporting rate limitations was also considered a
plus in choosing it.
An example of FTP test can be seen in Listing 5.8. Berkeley Software Distribution
(BSD) FTP implementation is used. In command option -4A forces use of IPv4
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and ACTIVE mode, -q 5 means timeout after 5 seconds if connection stalls. In
ftp://developer:cesdev@hosta1.demo.lte/ces.log the ftp:// is the protocol,
the developer:cesdev the username and the password, the @hosta1.demo.lte the
address of the server and the /ces.log location, in this case root, and file name
ces.log retrieved.
root@public1 :~# ftp -4A -q 5 ftp :// developer: cesdev@hosta1 .demo.lte/ces.log
Connected to hosta1.demo.lte.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.2)
331 Please specify the password.
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
200 Switching to Binary mode.
local: ces.log remote: ces.log
200 EPRT command successful. Consider using EPSV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for ces.log (124977543 bytes).
100% |***************************| 119 MiB 76.47 MiB/s 00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
124977543 bytes received in 00:01 (76.27 MiB/s)
221 Goodbye.
root@public1 :~#
Listing 5.8: Example of FTP test
In the printout, we can see the process of FTP connection. In addition, it also
shows information of the server we are connecting to, the size of the file and how
long it took to download it. In this case, connection was initiated from public1 to
hosta1, as can be seen from hostname at beginning in bash-prompt.
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6 General testing of CESv1
In this chapter, we cover the work done on testing the older implementation of CES.
First, we describe the division of scenarios we have chosen. Our work is focused on
three areas performance, Denial-of-Service and the DNS. Each area is divided into
sections where we describe the methodology, the results and provide some evaluation.
6.1 General
We chose 5 different scenarios for the testing of the system performance and operation.
Scenarios chosen for testing were:
1. CES as a NAT: Connecting from a private network to a public network where
a CES operates as a NAT. This is the most common use case in the early
adoption. For the user satisfaction, it is important that adoption of the CES
does not cause any noticeable negative changes in connectivity.
2. CES as an RGW: Connectivity from a public network to a private network
where a CES operated as a RGW with potential help from ALGs. Representing
the legacy use case which would be common before wide-scale adoption of
the CES. Shows potential of the immediate gains for regular users and is the
scenario for the users requiring inbound connectivity.
3. Intra-CES: Connectivity from one host to another with both behind one CES
in the same network. As the CES in the environment replaces the router the
performance in this capacity is an important factor. This is a potential use
case in the corporate networks.
4. Inter-CES: Connectivity from a host in one private network to a host in another
private network with both utilizing CES. This obvious scenario where the CES
operates as a CES.
5. Legacy: Connecting directly from a host to a different host in public network.
This gives a comparative benchmark of the situation where CES is not present.
6.2 Performance testing
6.2.1 Methodology
Performance testing was originally performed with 3 different protocols in the 5
different scenarios presented above. Chosen protocols were FTP, SCP and HTTP,
each being a popular point-to-point transport protocol. They were also already found
in the environment. Of the three both SCP and FTP allow both download and
upload of files in common use. Combinations of IPv4 and IPv6 and the passive and
active modes were done with FTP. All scenarios presented above were tested.
For testing, a 100MB file was generated from dev/urandom. Random data was
chosen as some protocols could utilize compression and raw throughput was the
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desired metric. The file generated was distributed to all hosts. Also on each host,
a new user was created as only the root accounts were present. This also allowed
the use of non-anonymous users in the FTP test case. Two copies of the test file
were stored on the machines: one in /home/developer for the FTP and the SCP
test cases and one in /usr/share/nginx/html for the HTTP protocol testing.
Due to slow data rates and automation concerns only the download results were
evaluated. This, however, should not have an effect on results as the initial tests point
towards similar numbers to be achieve in the upload case. In the test automation,
smaller file was chosen for faster test run times.
In addition, iperf was used to measure total throughput. The test was repeated
10 times using bash loop and results were collected. The average of measurements
with the minimum and the maximum observed in each case can be found in Table 6.1.
6.2.2 Results
Results for iperf can be seen in Table 6.1. Observed results from other scenarios
were in line with numbers listed here. We will describe the issues relating to them
later.
Scenario: Special: Average: Min: Max:
NAT TCP-Splice ON NaN NaN NaN
NAT TCP-Splice OFF 811 738 852
RGW TCP-Splice ON 1,11 0,99 1,12
RGW TCP-Splice OFF 800 731 842
Intra-CES - 673 618 703
Inter-CES Policy rloc: ipv4 533 517 554
Inter-CES Policy rloc: eth 1,64 1,48 1,81
Legacy - 1544 1050 1860
Table 6.1: Results of performance testing using iperf in Mbit/sec
The original test plans for the FTP included multiple variables: active or passive
mode and IPv4 or IPv6. In addition to these TCP-Splicing and Bot Detection
were variables. However most of the the tested combinations failed. As a result, we
do not believe that presenting them here to be productive. The measurements were
in line with presented ones when tested.
With the FTP and the HTTP testing, we found tnftp client to behave nicely
with the CES and not to cause crashes, unlike other programs. wget and the SCP
required manual limiting of bandwidth and thus made getting exact results harder.
Also, the limited test file size made the observations too variable when the system
was operating correctly.
Stall IOError: [Errno 11] Resource temporarily unavailable from the
CES printout was observed to be a common failure mode. This error was noted
when transfer rates for SCP were set to above 2,2 Mbit/s in inter-CES testing. Same
48
error in inter-CES was noted with wget and limit above 300 kB/s.
6.2.3 Evaluation
In general, we find the performance metrics to be acceptable where the system
operates correctly. The legacy scenario gives us the inter-container average transfer
rate of 1,544 Gbit/s which we consider the best case scenario for the test environment.
Communication via the CES in the NAT and the RGW scenarios seem to have around
50% lower performance with the intra-CES networking being still slightly lower than
this. As such there is a clear performance penalty with CES implementation in use.
We find the performance in the inter-CES scenario ipv4-rloc to be acceptable.
The loss of performance due to two CES instances being involved. In which case two
network translations will happen with both having overhead. The overhead from
protocol itself is also to be considered. Overall the performance is acceptable and
likely can be improved much further if desired.
The inter-CES communication with the policies using the eth rloc seems to
be lower than the other scenarios. We believe this to be due to some sort of
implementation error. Clear issues with implementation were also observed with
the TCP splicing option turned on. From discussions with the developers, it was
understood that there was an error in the implementation tested. However, due to
moving to a new version this error was not corrected. The manifested in IOError
likely linked to Ryu as the same message was also observed in tests performed in
next section.
6.3 Denial of Service
6.3.1 Methodology
Denial of Service testing was performed with hping3 tool generating TCP SYN packets
to varying port numbers. The rate at which system was stable over extended periods
of time was noted down. The tests were run from public1 to hosta1 with only CESA
running. Effects of the build in settings of TCP SPLICING and bot detection was
also used as parameters. The hping3 tool is presented in more detail in Section 5.3.
Packet size of 1460 bytes was used and the packet interval was varied until the stable
operating point was found. In addition, we run the test with both the CESA and
CESB running to observe if it would have any effects on results.
6.3.2 Results
Results for RGW can be seen in Table 6.2, where the interval is inter-packet delay
in microseconds, the rate is packets per second, the time is runtime of test or until
a crash was observed, the splicing and the detection corresponding to the state of
respective settings and the result is observation of result of test.
Stable operation was observed at packet interval of 2000 microseconds in all
scenarios. As seen the settings had an effect on results with the system performing
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better without them. In addition to this, all test cases were tested with option –flood
for tool to generate the maximum number of packets per second.
Interval: Rate: Time: Splicing: Detection: Result:
2000 500 20 min YES YES Stable
1500 666 7.5 min YES YES Crash
1200 833 0.08 min YES YES Crash
2000 500 24 min YES NO Stable
1500 666 7.6 min YES NO Crash
1200 833 0.013 min YES NO Crash
2000 500 18 min NO YES Stable
1500 666 14 min NO YES Stable
1200 833 0.08 min NO YES Crash
2000 500 5.5 min NO NO Stable
1500 666 12.5 min NO NO Stable
1000 1000 6.75 min NO NO Stable
800 1250 0.013 min NO NO Crash
Table 6.2: Results of stress testing RGW using hping3
In an additional test case where both CESA and CESB were running, we noted a
crash after 30 seconds with the rate of 500 packets per second, the stable point for
all setting combinations tested with single CES instance running. Further testing
with multiple sources of attack pointed towards same hard limits listed here.
Implementation in the test environment was always stable to around 500 TCP
SYN packets per second overall with the connections coming from public network to
CES. With the maximum payload of the system at 1540 bytes per packet at 500
packets a second the throughput would be 752 kB/s.
In the NAT scenario we saw stability at around 7500 to 10000 microseconds
intra-packet delay. Corresponding to 100 to 133 packets per second. In measuring
intra-ces scenario we noted that inter-packet delay of 30000 microseconds resulted in
crash after half a minute. With the delay of 50000 microseconds system was observed
to be stable after 12,5 minutes. The values would translate to 33 packets a second
and 20 packets per second.
For inter-CES scenarios, it appears that if ipv4 rloc is used once the connection
is established the system can handle the maximum rate which hosta1 can send.
However, before the connection is established DoS can affect the system. With eth
rloc very poor performance was observed.
6.3.3 Evaluation and suggestions
We found Ryu-component of CES-implementation to be susceptible to crashing under
certain kinds of load. During the testing, high CPU loads for container cesa was
observed. In the tests running multiple instances of CES similar behaviour was noted.
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This lead us to believe that the performance is constrained by CPU capacity. We also
observed the possibility of memory leaks during testing as memory use on container
kept increasing while running the test. Killing the CES process freed this memory
so we believe CES to allocate large quantities of memory in certain situations. Extra
CPU load from swapping and other kernel processes after memory was full is one
likely cause of pushing CPU use to unsustainable level. This will result in a crash
even if the system would otherwise be able to handle the load.
No significant correlation between packet sizes and throughput of packets were
observed in additional testing. The most likely culprit is the inefficient handling
of headers and routing inside the CES. The fact that host behind CES can also
effectively DoS CES points towards implementation errors. The alternative is that
the chosen technology is just not able to handle the traffic.
We do not believe that the tested implementation provides good enough perfor-
mance. Some type of filtering using either IDS or firewall would likely mitigate part
of the problems in attack scenarios. Iptables would be a suitable option for basic
filtering. Other alternative is the use of an efficient SYN-proxy which would mitigate
the problem, but at the same time option for splicing connections would be lost.
Generally, a more performant system is needed.
6.4 DNS attacks
6.4.1 Methodology
Basic dictionary attacks against the DNS were performed utilizing dnsrecon tool, a
multi-threaded DNS scan utility. A dictionary file of over 100000 words was used
and seeded with know hostnames, as the hostnames were not in the dictionary
initially. The attack was repeated against found hostnames to find possible services
on hosts. Also, we tested blacklisting functionality with a dictionary containing
multiple instances of known hostnames.
The goal of dictionary attack was to discover if some of the hosts behind RGW
could be effectively discovered. In addition, we wanted to test the effectiveness
of blacklisting techniques to discover if it was possible to circumvent blacklisting.
This was achieved by getting host blacklisted by repeatedly performing a query for
know FQDN. After the server was blacklisted we wanted to check how widely the
blacklisting applied.
6.4.2 Results
We found that the dictionary attacks were effective in gathering information of the
test-network and of possible services in it. We also noted that performance of the
DNS server connected to CES was relatively low compared to the bind9 running on
the public-dns. We estimated dnsrecon with 6 threads to be able to query about
1250 domains per second against public-dns and 662 sub-domains of hosta1.
In addition, we tested the DNS blacklisting functionality of CES. After 5 queries
the resolver was entered on the blacklist and no further A records were returned.
However, we noted that replies with RCODE 3 (NXDOMAIN) were still sent for names
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that did not exist. Additionally, the blacklisting did not seem to affect sub-domains
or AAAA records.
In some further testing in the environment, it was noted that bind9 service
running on public-dns did cache records with ttl value of 0 for approximately half
a second and did not perform recursive queries. This was replicated by using nc
command for trying to connect to non-open port on tested host. We also found the
dnsrelay running on cesa-ext to be susceptible to DoS with a high level of traffic
generation.
6.4.3 Evaluation
General performance seems to be bad for our chosen tool dnsrecon. The difference
between direct queries and using public-dns as resolver is notable, however. As
such we believe there is a performance issue with DNS relay in cesa-ext. A better
solution and more efficient system is required.
Blacklisting behaviour is working on the basic level. However, an attacker aware
of system behaviour could discern the existing host names even if they are blacklisted.
In such an attack hacker would be able to track which domains are confirmed to not
exist and ignore them while gathering a list of domains which no reply is generated
for or one is provided. Additionally blacklisting should extend to sub-domains and
AAAA which can be seen as an oversight.
One possibility to counter these types of attacks is to not send any NXDOIMAIN
replies. This would prevent the attacker from discerning existing hosts. This is not
desired behaviour from a DNS server but at least with blacklisted hosts this would
be acceptable behaviour. If outright lying to another server is acceptable a ICMP
Destination Unreachable is one option to prevent further traffic. We also suggest
not to use common host names found in dictionaries available.
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7 Fuzzing CES version 1 and CETP version 2
7.1 General
We understood that the most interesting use case of fuzz testing in CES was CETP.
As such attacks against protocol were considered the most important surface of
attack. This work could theoretically be divided in white-, grey- and black-box
testing. However no clear authoritative specification of the protocol was available.
This was to do with how the protocol and the implementation were still evolving.
As a result, effectively we were limited to white-box testing. This was especially true
later when certain implementation details needed to be verified from the source code
of CES.
After inspection of the protocol format from available sources, we were able to
make a choice between fuzz testing methodologies. We were also able to modify
available Wireshark dissector for the new protocol, as described in Chapter 5. One
of the key problems was choosing of the tooling. Due to CETP being transport layer
protocol and not utilizing the common TCP or UDP our options were very limited
inside the original design goal of building a system using Robot Framework. Effective
options could be found if the protocol had used TCP or UDP. The simplest way
to start testing was found to be simple random data approach with the recording
of potential responses from the system. From just these responses multiple clear
implementation errors were found.
Next, the author decided that even if it was possible to use existing implemen-
tation for CETP packet generation this was potentially wrong as any errors in the
implementation could not be found. As such goal to create an alternative implemen-
tation for the simple generation, sending, receiving and parsing of CETP packets
was set. The Robot Framework was chosen as the platform. For an extension of
the past work as this was one of the original goals. For this purpose CETPLibrary
described in more detail in page 38 was written.
7.2 Fuzz testing CETP version 2
For the generation of random data a tool called sendip. discussed in Section 5.3.6.
was chosen. sendip allowed generation of IP packets containing pseudorandom
data of select length with chosen header information such as the addresses and the
protocol. Packets were generated once a second using the watch command. Traffic
was monitored and gathered using Wireshark. The output of the CES was logged
and any processing of packets was noted and tracked to the matching packet. The
contents of packets noticed to generate response were copied from capture and saved
in files for replay.
In Figure 7.1 we can see an example of this random test data case. At the top,
we can see how the watch and the sendip is used to generate packets with the IP
protocol value of 254 and a length of 480 bytes. Multiple captured packets can be
seen in the Wireshark. The marked one has generated a reply from the CES. Dissect
of that packet and of the reply packet can be also seen. It is noted that even if the
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Figure 7.1: Use of sendip for random packet generation and Wireshark capture of
process
content of the packet is malformed for dissector some of the values from the header
have still been transformed to the reply. One example is the SST in the first packet
which can be also seen as the DST in the reply packet. The capture also present many
errors which we will discuss later.
7.2.1 Example of work: CETP header size field iterator
An example of work done can be found in Appendix C, where we test effects of
different values of CETP packet header fields. The process generally follows the one
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presented for Perform Security Handshake in Section 5.2.3. The main difference
is that we iterate over multiple values and modify the header length field after we
have generated the correct signature. Additionally, we read any potential output
from CES process.
7.3 Found issues
Figure 7.1 presents some of the implementation issues found. For the CETP handling,
we can see that the version value in the header is 100 (4) and not 010 (2) which
is the value used by this version of the protocol. This proves that the tested
implementation does not validate the version field. The next potential error in is
how the Control Flag is not set, but the Payload Flag is and the CES expects the
negotiation to follow from receiving this packet. Further on the header length field
is set to 2023 even if the length of the whole received IP packet is only 514 bytes
and CETP packet length is 480 bytes. Also, an issue with IP addresses is present in
this capture.
Figure 7.2 presents one more implementation issue. It turned out that CES
instances process and reply to any traffic received. In this capture we have replayed
the packet from Figure 7.1 using sendip. The packet is sent to 198.18.0.15 an
IP address belonging to CESA’s circular pool but is not an address advertised as
a CES end point address. We can note that the MAC address of one host is
00:00:00:00:02:a1 which is also used in the packet. Also, we can see that we get
a reply from IP address .15 with the same MAC address, however, we get a second
reply from 00:00:00:00:02:b1 the mac address of CESB from the same IP address
.15. In this case, the ICMP replies are generated by the public1 host as it does
not have an open socket for the protocol as the packets are generated directly to the
line. This behaviour was hard to track as the the virtual bridge involved eventually
discovers the interface with the correct MAC and stops switching traffic to other
hosts.
CETP Protocol , Control TLVs: exist
CETP Flags: 0x16
.... .110 1010 1000 = Header Length: 1704
Reserved: 242
0101 .... = SSTLen: 5
.... 0000 = DSTLen: 0
Souce Session Tag2:
11.. 1001 0110 1100 = CETP TLV: Unknown (0 xc96c)
11.. .... .... .... = Operation: Ack to Response (0 x0003)
..01 .... .... .... = Compatability: Set
.... 10.. .... .... = Extension: Set
.... ..01 0... .... = Group: RLOC types (0 x0002)
.... .... .110 1100 = Code: Set
Length: 25983
Value:
Listing 7.1: Dissection of CETP message causing KeyError
In the testing, it was also noted that the CES implementation does not handle
wrong values gracefully, but instead throws a keyerror in the log. This happens when
it receives a TLV with, for example, code value outside what it expects. An example
of a packet causing this can be found in Listing 7.1 and the log output in Listing 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: Use of sendip for packet replay and Wireshark capture of results
In the listing we can see the error being 108L and we find the same parameters in
code section of dissected message.
##############################
Processing a total of 1 Control TLV(s)
calling: Utils.exception_handler(’Packet Relay: process packet ’, ex)
Exception in Packet Relay: process packet: 108L
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/root/ces_controlplane_pox/src/CETPTLV.py", line 353, in _unpack_value
ret = self._unpack_rloc(value , group , code)
File "/root/ces_controlplane_pox/src/CETPTLV.py", line 397, in _unpack_rloc
code = TLV_CODE_RLOC[code]
KeyError: 108L
Listing 7.2: Truncated part of CETP log message in case of KeyError
56
7.3.1 Security handling
Minor details of implementation were also left unclear in previous work. This resulted
in a need to find information in the code. One such detail was that SHA-digest
signed in the signature TLV is a hex character string instead of bytes.
We found that using a incorrect certificate in the security handshake caused
the connecting CES to get blacklisted. We believe that this is an effective avenue
of attack as single spoofed packet can prevent further negotiation happening, thus
preventing the legitimate instance from establishing required trust.
CETP Protocol , Control TLVs: exist
CETP Flags: 0x53
.... .011 1000 0100 = Header Length: 900
Reserved: 0
0001 .... = SSTLen: 1
.... 0000 = DSTLen: 0
Souce Session Tag: 0x31000000
10.. 0001 1000 0101 = CETP TLV: Info: Control - Header Signature (0x8185)
10.. 0001 1000 1100 = CETP TLV: Info: Control - CES -Certificate (0 x818c)
00.. 0001 1000 1100 = CETP TLV: Query: Control - CES -Certificate (0 x018c)
00.. 0001 1000 0101 = CETP TLV: Query: Control - Header Signature (0x0185)
[Malformed Packet: CETP]
Listing 7.3: CETP details for packet containing security requirements and incorrect
header length
Additionally, it was noted that signatures of incoming packets were incorrectly
handled. In Listing 7.3 we provide a dissection of send capture. Where the Header
Signature provided is calculated from correct values for the header, but later the
length field in the header is modified before sending the packet. Applying the code
provided in Appendix C. In Listing 7.4 we can see the output from CES. Here we
can note that the signature is accepted even if the information it hashes does not
match the header.
##############################
Processing a total of 4 Control TLV(s)
Received TLVs #1. [info.cmp_notset.e_notset.control.headersignature -
(128 bytes of headersignature) ]
Received TLVs #2. [info.cmp_notset.e_notset.control.certificate -
(533 bytes of certificate) ]
Received TLVs #3. [query.cmp_notset.e_notset.control.certificate - ]
Received TLVs #4. [query.cmp_notset.e_notset.control.headersignature - ]
CES -certificate verification succeeded with CA
response_ctrl_certificate
response_ctrl_headersignature
CES Security policies are successfully negotiated
Sender ’198.18.0.112 ’ is admitted legitimate CES security requirements
Computing CETP HeaderSignature
Processing a total of 2 Control TLV(s)
Reply TLV #1. [response.cmp_notset.e_notset.control.certificate -
(530 bytes of certificate) ]
Reply TLV #2. [response.cmp_notset.e_notset.control.headersignature -
(128 bytes of headersignature) ]
start_transaction ()
Listing 7.4: Output from CES when accepting CES security requirements
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7.4 Evaluation issues
We believe that not handling the version and the header length correctly are clear
implementation issues which should be corrected. The CES should always validate
the version in a header it receives. Not doing the validations might mean failure
of communicating with a host which has further capabilities, but at the same time
supports the older version of the protocol.
The header length field is not compared to the length of received message. As
the CES protocol lacks any error checking this means that incomplete packets are
likely to be processed. This can cause complex issues in policy negotiation. Also
from the discussion with the developers, we understood that header length is used in
certain scenarios, but only as an upper limit in storage handling.
We discovered that the current implementation of CES effectively spoofs responses
from any packets it receives. We can show this in two different scenarios. One is
where traffic is received by the correct CES node, but to a wrong address and another
where even the MAC address does not match the CES device. In the later case, the
reply is produced from an IP address that does not even belong to host. In general,
it is still an undesired behaviour for the CES to use address not configured for the
purpose and advertised when queried.
Minor error in implementation was that certain error cases were not handled
gracefully. Providing a value outside the expected range produced error. The
preferred way would be to catch these errors and handle them better. This can be
achieved easily by use of try-catch blocks.
We discussed the signature issue with developers and checked the code. We
understood that signature handling for the security handshake is incorrect. The
TLVs and Session tags are read from the header and then used in reconstructing of the
message from which the signature TLV is removed and then a hash is calculated and
verified against one provided. In further testing, it was found that also other fields like
version and reserved were ignored in this process. The correct, implementation
would read the whole message in memory and then remove signature TLV after
which the signature hash would be calculated and verified.
From our understanding, the protocol lacks any sort of error-checking mechanism.
This is a desired feature from transport layer protocols which CETP in this incarnation
desires to be. For rudimentary error checking, the reserved field can be used or
extra mandatory TLV can be introduced. This is especially needed if protocol aims
to fully support IPv6 which does not have any error-checking but instead relies on
further layers. Overall we were unable to locate any extreme exploits in the code.
Further work could be done with the focus on lower level components as there is also
potential to find exploits there. However, as the implementation is in Python we
consider finding any errors unlikely.
7.5 Evaluation of tools and methodologies
In retrospect, the use of Robot Framework for testing CETP protocol itself was a
poor choice. Robot Framework excels in the type of testing previously done and
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automating some of the performed attacks. For those we found it sufficient and easy
to use option. As such the work expanding it in those scenario can be found in
Section 8.5,
However, we did not find its ecosystem to support the type of protocol testing
needed in our case. Key problems were protocol’s utilization of raw sockets and
special cases of networking such as encapsulation. We found it to be possible to
implement basic negotiation and message generation with our custom CETPLibrary.
Due to the nature of the protocol, however, use of raw sockets was needed, which
required running software with very high privileges. This itself made the code
iteration unnecessarily complex. Furthermore, the effective message generation for
the payload was found complex.
Some fuzz testing scenarios were found possible with the implemented system.
It was also effective in the simple generation of messages for testing the edge-cases.
However, automating testing was not possible as the only method of monitoring CES
was to observe the log. Improved logging and communication of error cases could
solve this problem. The quiet failing of the system was also an observed behaviour.
With the potential of blacklisting in these cases complex iteration was not possible.
With these types of systems better monitoring and integration of tools to the system
under test is likely the best way of moving forward.
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8 General testing of CESv2 and porting of RF
tests
8.1 General
In Section 6.1 we presented 5 scenarios for testing. At the time of writing of this
thesis CES to CES functionality was not available in the new version and as such
many of the scenarios previously presented could not be used for testing. We present
the scenarios and changes to them below.
1. CES as a NAT: Connectivity from a private network to a public network where
the CES operates as a NAT. We repeated tests where applicable against the
new RGW implementation.
2. CES as an RGW: Connectivity from a public network to private network where
the CES operates as a PRGW with possible ALG. We repeated tests where
applicable against the new RGW implementation.
3. Intra-CES: Connectivity from one host to another behind single CES with
both hosts in the same private network. This scenario was not repeatable
as the architecture of the test environment was changed and all hosts were
simulated on a single host. However, this scenario should not differ from the
Legacy scenario.
4. Inter-CES: Connectivity from one private network to another private network
with both utilizing CES. This scenario was not repeated as CES to CES
functionality was not available for testing in the new version.
5. Legacy: Connectivity directly from host to host in a network. We repeated
tests where applicable to get the comparative baseline.
From the above we can see that the Inter-CES scenario is the only one not
currently available. The Intra-CES scenario is possible, but current test environment
is not set up the same way as the old one. However, we believe it to be sufficiently
close to Legacy scenario.
8.2 Performance testing
8.2.1 Methodology
The test performed against old version were redone against the new iptables based
version. Due to missing CES functionality only NAT, RGW and legacy tests were
repeated. In addition to these, we present two legacy scenarios one between public
and router and one between public and gwa. These tests aim to provide a picture
of performance lost in general when iptables is used in routing. The public - gwa
should offer performance equal or slightly lower to the old intra-CES scenario.
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Tests were run using iperf with default settings. The command was repeated
10 times and results were collected. FTP testing also consisted of 10 runs and both
active and passive mode were tested.
8.2.2 Results
Results from the iperf tests are presented in Table 8.1 with measurements in
megabits per second. Considerable CPU loads were observed during the testing. All
tests with iperf run without any noted errors.
Scenario: Hosts: Average: Min: Max:
NAT public - test_gwa 30 070 28 100 31 300
RGW test_gwa - public 30 670 29 500 31 800
Legacy public - router 45 720 42 000 50 200
Legacy public - gwa 36 340 34 400 37 500
Table 8.1: Results of performance testing using iperf in Mbit/sec
FTP test were repeated in NAT and RGW scenarios. Performance measured
for RGW was an average of 959 MB/s, minimum of 855 MB/s and maximum of
1 016 MB/s in active mode. For NAT in passive mode results were an average of
952 MB/s, minimum of 876 MB/s and maximum of 1 014 MB/s. For RGW passive
mode did not work and for NAT active mode did not work.
8.2.3 Evaluation
From the results presented above, we can see that the performance is excellent in all
of the scenarios. The observed test result seems to be order of an order of magnitude
higher than with those presented in Table 6.1. The RGW and NAT scenarios appear
to offer same performance number, as the difference of 2% can be explained by high
loads observed and general variability in the testing.
We can note there to be a general penalty from routing, as the best case scenario
of two hosts communicating with each other is 45,7 Gb/s. The public - gwa was
measured at 36,34 Gb/s for a route of public - router - gwa where traffic between
hosts is routed at the router. Further performance penalty can be observed from the
route public - test_gwa at rate of 30,07 GB/s where the longer route of public -
router - gwa - test_gwa exist and additionally NATing is done.
The performance results from the FTP point towards 7,6 Gb/s speeds. Consider-
ing the small test file size and overheads involved with dealing with the filesystem,
the performance is very good. The CES also appears to offer very good performance
in test scenarios that are closer to reality. However, lack of ALG for the FTP is noted,
which can be seen from the operation, where no extra connections from outside are
possible. This will stop various protocols and applications from operating correctly
with RGW.
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For comparison of the best case legacy scenarios between CESv1, see Table 6.1,
and CESv2 we have the numbers of 1 544 Mbit/s and 45 720 Mbit/s. From this
we can calculate a ratio of 29,6 or about 30 between the environments. With this
ratio we can do some comparisons between the systems. The NAT scenario where
the old system offered 811,8 Mbit/s would equal about 24 Gbit/s rate, RGW would
be the same. Compared to new versions circa 30 Gbit/s rates we can estimate the
performance gain from the new system to be around 20%.
Overall, we believe that this version offers reasonable opportunities in real world
use if the features of RGW are desired. We do not have the performance numbers
from CES, but we are doubtful that they would be anywhere near the performance
presented. This is due to planned encapsulation of data for CES-to-CES communica-
tion and overheads involved in this process. However, we do not believe the current
implementation to be the bottleneck for any such system.
Iptables is mature, optimised and understood technology and as such we see its
adoption as a very practical choice. Building on it allows utilization of much of the
existing work.
8.3 Denial of Service
We repeated the experiments presented in Section 6.3 where applicable. Scenarios of
RGW and NAT were used. hping3 was used to generate traffic with –flood option
from public to test_gwa and from test_gwa to public. No issues were noted during
the running of the test.
We found the new version to handle SYN-flood with grace and continued to
operate well. We believe this to be due to SYN-proxy utilized. Further on, the
design using iptables to handle the traffic is also good, as the userspace component
is loaded only by the new connections. Limiting the DNS rate also is working and
effective way for stopping DoS. As a result we believe that the system should not
face loads it cannot handle gracefully.
8.4 DNS attacks
DNS attacks presented in Section 6.4 were repeated. However, the new system does
not have the blacklisting functionality of older version. As such the correct operation
of blacklisting could not be tested. Major DNS traffic was generated with dnsenum
tool.
The new iptables based RGW has a DNS rate limitation system and this was
found operating correctly when tested. During generation of DNS traffic, the system
was found stable under the load of thousands of queries per seconds. With further
and more extensive DNS query generation we found the system to still be stable. As
such we do not expect the system to be susceptible to DNS DoS.
Repeating the test of same queries with short timing differences against dnsmasq
did not produce similar response as bind9 did. Both queries were recursively handled
and resulted in new allocations from the circular pool. It appears that dnsmasq has
the desired behaviour in our test environment.
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Vulnerability in dnsmasq server used to effectively route queries at router was
found. By repeating zone transfer queries from public it was possible to crash the
dnsmasq. This was believed to be due to the interaction between dnsmasq and bind9
running on the same host where these zone transfers were forwarded. The issue was
not considered critical or possible in systems that do not use this combination.
8.5 Porting of Robot Framework test cases
At midway of the thesis process, the iptables version of CES was deemed testable. At
this point, only RGW functionality was testable. As the old version was not going
to be developed further, it was decided to move efforts to testing of the new version.
For this, the existing test cases were to be ported over to the new version.
In this process, it was found that existing tests were largely not suitable to be
used in the new version, being extraneous or too specific. As such starting from
fresh and only bringing basics and some of the specific applicable test cases over was
considered as the best option
We believed that test suites should test both the environment, orchestrated with
scripts and functionality of RGW and CES. As such we did not want to limit test
suites just to testing of CES as an issue in the environment would likely have effect
on tests too.
In general, the current approach in testing is to cover needed regressions to make
sure that, as the system is updated and build up, no changes affect the operation. In
the process there has been multiple occasions where incorrect operation or breaking
changes in the test environment was detected.
The main goal of the new test design was to heavily rely on building things from
smaller keywords to larger test keywords so the code could be reused. Additionally,
we were able to leverage the design of the Robot Framework by setting our own
parameters for different system behaviour. Two more interesting use cases of these
were a parameter for either running all of the test cases in a test suite within a single
state or restarting the CES instance after each test case. With this, we also designed
a way for us to log related output from the CES to each test case.
8.5.1 General structure
In the design of the tests, it was deemed that some logical division was needed and
we considered folders to be the suitable option for this. Scenarios presented deemed
the clearest division of responsibility. In addition to scenarios, it was considered
good practise to separate the used keyword libraries and resources. The following
folder structure was chosen:
1. Libraries: libraries, resource and keyword files.
2. Connectivitytest: test suite for testing connectivity to general Internet.
Additionally could be expanded to test needed to run against environment.
3. NATTest: test suites for testing RGW’s NAT component with multiple protocols,
including general connectivity.
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4. RGWTest: test suites for testing RGW’s RGW component with multiple proto-
cols.
In addition, each test written was tagged with relevant tags such as nat, wget,
hosta, http and public. These tags usually contained the scenario, hosts involved,
program used and relevant protocol.
8.5.2 Libraries files
Libraries folder contains the generic keywords used in multiple test suites. This
allows modification in single place to change behaviour in all of the test cases. Each
general use case is separated into an individual robot file.
In Libraries global_lib.robot contains keywords for logging in on host either
using username and password or RSA-keys. In addition, it contains keywords for
starting and stopping CES instances and checking its state. It also provides keywords
for logging CES output. Global_variables.robot contains variables for storing
names, ip addresses and other information relevant to the whole environment.
Utility_lib.robot contains general keywords for executing commands on the
command line, in various ways, and checking the status of these executions. dns,
ftp, iperf and ncat_lib.robot contain generic keywords for more specific test
and general tests keywords for launching client and servers on hosts provided as
arguments.
8.5.3 Connectivitytest test suites
Connectivitytest contains legacytest.robot test suite. The test suite contains
tests for general connectivity to general Internet. This suite exist to prove that
environment works correctly and failures in other suites such as RGW are not errors
in RGW, but of the environment itself. Example found of such case in testing is
missing NATing in the host VM.
The tests included pinging of well know hosts such as Google. Using various tools
such as wget and curl to retrieve websites from general Internet. Downloading file
using ftp, doing DNS query and performing repository update.
8.5.4 NATTest test suites
NATTest contains dhcptest.robot, legacytest.robot, nattest.robot and
nstest.robot test suite files. The aim of these test suites is to test that NAT
component of RGW allows correct communication with hosts inside the environment
and the general Internet. As RGW should not have negative effects on the host.
Suite legacytest.robot contains the same test suite as legacytest.robot
in Connectivitytest. This allows to test that RGW does not stop any normal
communication to general Internet. Suite nattest.robot contains various tests for
communicating with mainly host public inside the environment. Correct operation
of various protocols and the firewall rules in RGW for outbound traffic are tested.
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Suites dhcptest.robot and nstest.robot are currently bare, but allow building
on the testing of network namespaces. Network namespaces were chosen to allow
simulating multiple hosts using a single container. Dhcptest.robot contains initial
support for testing namespaces on test_gwa querying for configuration via DHCP.
Nstest.robot contains test for custom policies uploaded from machine running to
gwa operating correctly and allowing the namespaces to be communicated to. In
addition the policy uploaded contains some rules not covered in standard policies.
8.5.5 RGWTest test suites
RGWTest contains test suites for testing RGW components operation. It should allow
seamless connectivity from outside to host behind it using FQDNs. RGW is also
going to contain various ALGs and HTTP proxy.
Test suite rgwtest.robot contains individual test cases to assert that various
protocols and applications such as ping, http, iperf, iperf3, dns, tcp, udp and sctp
operate correctly. Also rules for inbound traffic with mentioned protocols are tested.
FTPTest.robot is an extension for this test suite containing the test suite for FTP.
More clear direction if test suite should be separated into multiple suites further or
if FTPTest.robot should be merged back into rgwtest.robot should be discussed
in future.
NSPolicyTest.robot is a special test suite for testing network namespaces like
nstest.robot. Its main goal is to make sure that services such as nginx, a web
server, can be run inside a namespaces and they can be communicated to. In addition,
the test its checks that group policies defined for hosts in the policy files are operating
correctly and only allow defined type of traffic through.
8.6 Future work
The author recommends expanding the above with test suites relating to the CES
operation when the features in the new version are available and the interactions
between components are testable. The author’s opinion would be the division of
the test suites based on layers in the case of CES. Host to host connectivity over
CES would be one clear scenario. Correct usage of certificates and other such issues
in general security can also be considered as a separate scenario. The use of wrong
certificate was one test in the old framework. From the discussions about the new
version, there is a new components being developed. These are likely to offer new
and interesting opportunities for fuzz testing.
65
9 Conclusions
We tested two different versions of CES. For this purpose, we established 5 different
scenarios. We believe these scenarios to provide s good framework for testing and
believe that they should be reused in the future. We found the older version to offer
acceptable implementation in many areas, but we also found multiple faults which
could have been corrected. We believe that the new version of CES offers s great
base to build on. For best product, the blacklisting should be reintroduced in some
form with the ALGs for relevant protocols.
In the general operation, the version 1 seems to perform well. However, we noted
that there are some scenarios where some type of implementation error hinders the
work. In future, we hope that team can iterate over these sort of issues in their
work. We found the DNS blacklisting to be an interesting idea and believe the found
issues of blacklisting not applying to all types of traffic to be simple fixes. However,
the most critical issue of the system from our viewpoint is the susceptibility to DoS
attacks. We found the system to be extremely weak against even relatively low rate
attacks in many scenarios. However, we were genuinely surprised by the scenario
involving established CES data plane traffic, which offered very promising results.
In our work with the CETP protocol, we found multiple issues with implementa-
tion. We observed both clear lack of validation the received data and implementation
details that could be handled better. We believe the most critical issue is the imple-
mentations lack of traffic filtration and using any destination address of a received
packet as the source address in the replies. The protocol itself lacks any error detec-
tion facilities, which combined with the handling of erroneous inputs is an issue that
we hope will be rectified in the future versions.
CES version 2 showed a lot of promise when we performed the test done against
the old versions. The performance was excellent and we did not find any effective
attacks against the system. With the reintroduction of some of the ideas from version
1 we believe that it can be developed to an effective system. On the environment
side, we found the orchestration system very easy and pleasant to work with. It
could allow great options in the future for automatizing builds and testing.
We hope that our work in building the testing framework for CES will provide
the direction forwards. The Robot Framework combined with above-mentioned
orchestration system should allow easy transfer and testing of the system around for
development. Our work should provide a logical base to build up from when more
features become available and need testing. For this purpose, we believe that Robot
Framework is an excellent choice and believe that it will serve well.
In the field of fuzz, testing we found the Robot Framework to be a sub-optimal
solution. While it was possible to generate needed signalling traffic the nature
of the protocol made testing unnecessarily complex. Extension to full workable
implementation is likely possible, but suboptimal. Additionally, we did not find
the system to offer good enough debugging facilities for effective testing of the
implementation. For further work in this field, I believe some sort of facilities should
be provided or at least have access to improved logging of critical failures. With
proper facilities use of some other system for testing could provide interesting results.
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Another issue with our work was the lack of proper documentation. We believe that
this type of work should not be done before there is a specification available and
implementation is near completion. However, this type of testing should be done as
critical errors in design or implementation are likely to be found and any such issues
should be corrected in an iterative process.
Looking at the process in retrospect, we believe that we started this work at a
wrong time. At starting of the work the old system was no longer under development,
but the new version was promised to be available soon very soon. This itself was
clearly a bad starting point, testing a system that is going to be replaced does not
have great value. This is especially valid in our case as the design of the new CETP
protocol itself has been entirely changed in nature from a custom binary protocol
operating over IP to a text-based protocol over TCP utilizing standard protocols. At
a time of writing this the author’s understanding is that work on the new protocol
and implementation is still under way. We are however thankful that new version
offering interesting new challenges and opportunities became available, albeit late,
but at the midway of the thesis process and it was decided to focus on the new
version.
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A Appendix: CETPLibrary documentation
CETPLibrary
===========
Scope: test case
Named arguments: supported
Library of objects and functions for use of testing CETP remotely.
Append Certificate Tlv
----------------------
Arguments: [certFileName , tlvs=None]
Appends certificate to tlv list.
Append Signature Tlv
--------------------
Arguments: [header , keyFileName , tlvs=None]
Appends signature to provided tlv list.
Append Tlv
----------
Arguments: [tlv , tlvs=None]
Appends TLV dictionary to given list of TLVs , if no list provides creates new one
Bytes To B64
------------
Arguments: [buff]
Bytes To CETP Message
---------------------
Arguments: [packet]
Attempts convert a received packet to header and TLV list
Bytes To TLVs
-------------
Arguments: [buff , offset]
Attempts to convert given string with offset to multiple TLVs
Fuzz Header Field
-----------------
Arguments: [header , field]
Fuzzes given field in header
Fuzz Tlv Field
--------------
Arguments: [tlv , field]
Fuzzes given field in tlv
Header To Base64
----------------
Arguments: [header]
Returns base64 encode of the header
Header To Bytes
---------------
Arguments: [header]
Converts the given header to struct presented as string suitable to be send
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Modify Field Header
-------------------
Arguments: [header , field , value]
Modifies single field in header dictionary
Modify Field Tlv
----------------
Arguments: [tlv , field , value]
Modifies single field in tlv dictionary
Modify Header Value B64
-----------------------
Arguments: [header , b64]
Modifies value field in header dictionary
to provided b64 encoded string
New Header Dictionary
---------------------
Arguments: [version=3, control=False , payload=False ,
length=0, SST=, DST=, value=]
Returns a dictionary containing values relevant to header.
Fields: control , payload , length(size of message), SST , DST , value
New Socket
----------
Arguments: []
Creates a new raw IP socket
New Tlv Dictionary
------------------
Arguments: [operation=0, compatibility =0, extension=0, group=0,
code=0, TLVvalue =]
Returns a dictionary containing values relevant to single TLV.
Fields: operation , compatibility , extension , group , code and TLVvalue
New Tlvpayload Dictionary
-------------------------
Arguments: [operation=0, compatibility =0, extension=0, group=0,
code=0,mobility=0, DQ=0, TTL=0, proto=0, payload =]
Returns a dictionary containing values relevant to single payload TLV.
Fields: operation , compatibility , extension , group , code ,
mobility , DQ, TTL , Proto and TLVvalue
Padded Len
----------
Arguments: [len]
Calculates padded length.
Returns same or next number divisible by 4.
Query NAPTR
-----------
Arguments: [hostname]
Queries given hostname for NAPTR records.
Randomize List
--------------
Arguments: [tlvs]
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Suffles the given list
Receive Via Socket
------------------
Arguments: []
Receive up to 2048 byte from scoket
Seed Random
-----------
Arguments: [seed]
Seeds then random number generator with provided seed.
Send B64 Via Socket
-------------------
Arguments: [src , dst , b64]
Sends IP datagram with decoded byte64 string as payload.
Send Via Socket
---------------
Arguments: [src , dst , buff]
Sends IP datagram via socket with provided buffer as payload.
Signed B64 Message
------------------
Arguments: [header , keyFileName , tlvs=None]
Returns a byte64 encoded header with signature TLV appended.
Tlv To Bytes
------------
Arguments: [tlv]
Converts given TLV to struct presented as base64 encoded string.
Tlvpayload To Bytes
-------------------
Arguments: [tlv]
Converts payload TLV to struct presented as string to be send
Tlvs To Bytes
-------------
Arguments: [tlvs]
Convert multiple TLVs from a list to struct presented
as string to be send.
Update Header Length
--------------------
Arguments: [header]
Updates the header length field to match length of content.
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B Appendix: CETP_lib.robot
*** Settings ***
Library Remote http ://192.168.254.112:25400
*** Variables ***
#Constants for use of CETP
#Operations
${OPEQuery} ${0}
${OPEResponse} ${1}
${OPEInfo} ${2}
#" Compatibility"
${CMPNava} ${0}
${CMPAva} ${1}
${CMPnreq} ${2}
${CMPreq} ${3}
#Extensions
${Ext} ${0}
#Group
${GRPId} ${0}
${GRPPayload} ${1}
${GRPRloc} ${2}
${GRPControl} ${3}
${GRPMobility} ${4}
#C RLOC
${CRLOCIPv4} ${1}
${CRLOCIPv6} ${2}
${CRLOCEth} ${3}
#C Payload
${CPLIPv4} ${1}
${CPLIPv6} ${2}
${CPLEth} ${3}
#C Control
${CCTRLCESID} ${0}
${CCTRLDStep} ${1}
${CCTRLTerm} ${2}
${CCTRLWarn} ${3}
${CCTRLRateLim} ${4}
${CCTRLHeadSig} ${5}
${CCTRLCACES} ${6}
${CCTRLCAEP} ${7}
${CCTRLACK} ${8}
${CCTRLTAG} ${9}
${CCTRLTTL} ${10}
${CCTRLPOW} ${11}
${CCTRLCERT} ${12}
#C ID
${CIDFQDN} ${1}
${CIDMAID} ${2}
${CIDMOC} ${3}
${CIDHASH} ${4}
${CIDTEMP} ${5}
${CIDRandom} ${6}
${CIDBBBBid} ${7}
${CIDMSisdn} ${8}
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*** Keywords ***
Send message
[Arguments] ${header} ${src} ${dst}
${bytes} Header to bytes ${Header}
${b64} bytes to b64 ${bytes}
Send b64 via socket ${src} ${dst} ${b64}
Add TLVs
[Arguments] ${header} ${tlvs}
${tlvsBytes} TLvs to bytes ${tlvs}
${header} Modify Field Header ${header} value ${tlvsbytes}
${header} Update Header Length ${header}
[Return] ${header}
Perform Security Handshake
[Arguments] ${src} ${dst} ${certFileName} ${keyFileName}
${header} New Header Dictionary version=${2}
... control=${TRUE} payload=${FALSE} SST=1
${tlvHSReq} New TLV Dictionary operation=${OPEQuery}
... group=${GRPControl} code=${CCTRLHeadSig}
${tlvCertReq} New TLV Dictionary operation=${OPEQuery}
... group=${GRPControl} code=${CCTRLCert}
${tlvs} Append Certificate TLV ${certFileName}
${tlvs} Append TLV ${tlvCertReq} ${tlvs}
${tlvs} Append TLV ${tlvHSReq} ${tlvs}
${header} Add tlvs and signature ${header} ${tlvs} ${keyFileName}
Send Message ${header} 198.18.0.112 198.18.0.10
${packet} receive via socket
${header} ${tlvs} Bytes to CETP Message ${packet}
Setup
New Socket
Add tlvs and signature
[Arguments] ${header} ${tlvs} ${keyFileName}
${header} Add TLVs ${header} ${tlvs}
${tlvs} Append Signature TLV ${header} ${keyFileName} ${tlvs}
${header} Add TLVs ${header} ${tlvs}
[Return] ${header}
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C Appendix: Test case for RF CETP Security
Handshake with header size-field iteration
*** Settings ***
#Relevant parameters to be used with CETP protocol dictionaries
#Relevant IP addresses and Domain names
#Helper methods common for CES testing
Resource ../ global_lib.robot
Resource ../ global_variables.robot
Resource ../ CETP_lib.robot
Library SSHLibrary
#Remote library on public host1
Library Remote http ://192.168.254.112:25400
#Library CETPLibrary
Suite Setup New Socket
*** Variables ***
${keyFileName} /root/CETPLibrary/public1.demo.lte.private
${certFileName} /root/CETPLibrary/public1.demo.lte.certificate.der
*** Test Cases ***
Handskahe
[Documentation] Simple policy test
${conn} Log In ${cesa} ${username} ${password}
write tail -F /root/ces_controlplane_pox/src/ces.log
${output} read
: FOR ${INDEX} IN RANGE 13 1000
\ ${header} New Header Dictionary version=${2}
\ ... control=${TRUE} payload=${FALSE} SST=1
\ ${tlvHSReq} New TLV Dictionary operation=${OPEQuery}
\ ... group=${GRPControl} code=${CCTRLHeadSig}
\ ${tlvCertReq} New TLV Dictionary operation=${OPEQuery}
\ ... group=${GRPControl} code=${CCTRLCert}
\ ${tlvs} Append Certificate TLV ${certFileName}
\ ${tlvs} Append TLV ${tlvCertReq} ${tlvs}
\ ${tlvs} Append TLV ${tlvHSReq} ${tlvs}
\ ${header} Add TLVs ${header} ${tlvs}
\ ${tlvs} Append Signature TLV ${header} ${keyFileName} ${tlvs}
\ ${header} Add TLVs ${header} ${tlvs}
\ ${header} Modify field Header ${header} length ${INDEX}
\ Send Message ${header} 198.18.0.112 198.18.0.10
\ ${packet} receive via socket
\ ${header} ${tlvs} Bytes to CETP Message ${packet}
\ Switch Connection ${conn}
\ ${output} Read loglevel=WARN
